2025 marks the 60thth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (now South Korea). As this date approaches, so does the opportunity to reflect on bilateral relations between Tokyo and Seoul.
The end of the Asia-Pacific War did not result in a peaceful reconstruction of the regional order in East Asia. Following the Japanese occupation (1910-1945), the Korean peninsula was divided into two separate countries in the 38th parallel. This moment also marked the beginning of the period of authoritarian rule that characterized the South Korean political scene until 1987. However, the democratic transition of the 1990s sparked discussions about the human rights violations suffered in the over the previous seventy years. As a result, several short-term truth commissions were established with the aim of investigating issues related to this period, including Korea under Japanese occupation, the Korean War, and authoritarian rule. A notable example of this situation is the Korea Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was relaunched in 2020.
Despite these advances in the search for a more truthful account of Korean history, the emergence of different narratives has hampered these developments. In addition to disagreements at the national level, conflicts over the historical past also influence its relations with other countries: notably with Japan. From Tokyo’s point of view, all issues of the colonial period must be referred to the treaties signed at the end of the war, namely the San Francisco Peace Treaty; However, in Seoul’s view, the victims have not received enough apology or compensation. Yet a closer look at these relationships demonstrates the complexity of the reconciliation process.
The case of the former “comfort women” illustrates this pattern of rising tensions and rapprochement in bilateral relations. The Japanese government has issued two statements of apology: the Kono Declaration, in 1993, and the Murayama Declaration, in 1995. Additionally, the government established the Asian Women’s Fund to compensate victims, although this fund has was supported by private donations from the Japanese government. Japanese company, instead of being financed by government means. This led many survivors to criticize and reject the project.
In 2015, President Park Geun-hye and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reached an agreement that resolved the issue “permanently and irreversibly.” Although the majority of Japanese and South Koreans view the “comfort women” issue as the second obstacle to improving bilateral relations, the agreement has been met with backlash from Korean society. As in the past, the agreement was rejected due to the principle that the negotiations were conducted in secret. Most importantly, without prior consultation with victims, the outcome document did not “represent a victim-centered approach”, a claim supported by the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women .
The resignation of Shinzo Abe – who was deeply unpopular in South Korea – and the election of Yoon Suk-yeol – who expressed interest in strengthening ties with Japan – created an opening for establishing talks. President Yoon’s meeting with Prime Minister Kishida helped revive bilateral relations, which over time led to the resolution of the trade dispute that began in 2019.
This type of behavior is widespread in bilateral relations: Korean activist groups seek to reassure themselves of the Japanese government by demanding clear recognition of the past; Japanese politicians (e.g. Shinzo Abe) promote narratives that contradict official government statements (e.g. visits to the Yasukuni Shrine; statements denying Japan’s role in establishing the system of sexual slavery). In turn, Korea’s criticism and anger are seen by the Japanese as an annoying emphasis on the past and an avoidance of a “future-oriented” approach – which has been a key topic in bilateral discussions for years. years. Ultimately, this cycle exacerbates tensions between the two countries, until a more pressing issue arises and temporarily distracts attention. Yet, given the overall picture described so far, it appears that bilateral relations are doomed to repeat this pattern. However, this deterministic prediction should not bind relations between Japan and South Korea.
So let’s look at relationships from another angle: are historical conflicts a structural problem or can individual agents help break the cycle? On the one hand, civil society plays a central role in this case study. The issue of “comfort women” perfectly illustrates the importance of non-governmental agents in international relations. Not only have victims and associated organizations raised awareness about this issue, they have sometimes done so without support from their governments. On the other hand, existing institutional arrangements also fuel potential conflicts. Specifically, the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Treaty on Basic Relations, and the 2015 Agreement form the basis of relations between Japan and South Korea, shaping and constraining their interactions. A single actor can cause serious damage to bilateral relations; but its behavior is also limited by the institutional apparatus in place. In a period of rising nationalist narratives that overlook the past actions of the Japanese empire, the actions of key actors – such as government officials – contribute to the crystallization of these ideas in society. The resulting rise in tensions makes it even more difficult to contradict these narratives and find alternative paths.
In this sense, as hostilities and tensions continue to escalate in the East Asian region, I would argue that there should be more peace-oriented approaches. As Japan and South Korea share similar values, they would benefit from strengthening their bilateral relations. This does not mean, however, that historical questions should be relegated to the background. Instead, a long-term view of bilateral relations must include comprehensive thinking about East Asian history, including the actions of the Japanese Empire on the Korean Peninsula and other countries. . This could be done through a cooperative effort by different governments, in addition to civil society organizations and victims. In practice, this could translate into initiatives in museums, schools, universities and social media platforms, which would show a more accurate account of history. The more awareness of these issues, the easier it will be to combat the growing revisionist movement that erases victims’ experiences. It can be argued that the inclusion of victims in the search for a solution to historical problems is the most determining factor in achieving an honest resolution of disputes.
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