In August 2024, Brazil and China celebrated the 50th anniversary of their diplomatic relations. These are arguably the two largest economies on the western and eastern sides of the Global South respectively. And although the relationship has not always been extremely meaningful, over the past two decades the two countries have found ways to deepen their interactions, both between private and public actors. Indeed, since his return to power in early 2023, President Lula of Brazil has sought to further strengthen his ties with China. He visited the Asian giant, accompanied by a large delegation of political leaders and business leaders. Bilateral relations have also been strengthened through additional meetings, including the important BRICS conference in South Africa last year. As Brazil hosts the nineteenth meeting of the Group of Twenty (G20) in Rio next month, Presidents Lula and Xi will have the opportunity to discuss the next steps in what many consider one of the most important bilateral relations. more promising in today’s complex global context.
After a dramatic political crisis that hit his country in the middle of the last decade, Lula, a former metalworker turned president, managed to obtain a third presidential term. Brazil continues to be deeply divided politically and ideologically, but Lula is working to revive a diplomatic approach that served him well during his first two terms: a universalist vision that seeks to maintain good relations with his traditional partners , such as the United States, while looking for ways to strengthen ties and projects with new markets, nations and organizations. In this context, and based on Lula’s vision and diplomatic ambitions, deepening ties with China becomes central because it offers the possibility of consolidating economic relations that have helped support the Brazilian economy over the last two decades, while strengthening multilateral projects aimed at reshaping the multilateral system. liberal order, like the New Development Bank (NDB)
The next G20 meeting will indeed offer the opportunity to expand Sino-Brazilian relations. In addition to their meeting in Rio, Lula and Xi will hold bilateral talks in Brasilia and appear keen to announce new joint projects. Although details are not available, it is worth recalling that when he assumed the role of leader of the group about a year ago, Lula declared his intention to bring to the forefront of the organization the objectives of ( a) reduce world hunger, (b) accelerate the energy transition towards a more sustainable development model, and (c) reform the current form of multilateral institutions, such as the IMF and the UNSC, so that developing countries can be better represented. In these three areas, Chinese leaders could provide significant political support and skilled expertise. Likewise, Chinese officials signaled that Lula’s priorities for his leadership of the G20 were aligned with President Xi’s vision for building a community for a shared future.
In addition to potential collaboration within the multilateral framework of the G20, Brazil and China have many other areas in which they could strengthen their ties and where new projects could potentially emerge. In 2023, bilateral trade reached a record $157 billion, surpassing Brazil’s combined $104 billion in sales to the United States and the European Union. Brazil is the fourth major destination for Chinese overseas investment, accounting for 4.8 percent of the global total, according to the China-Brazil Business Council (CBBC). These investments have become increasingly essential to the objective of modernizing infrastructure that Lula sought to revive on the basis of his program of accelerating growth (Growth Acceleration Program — PAC) and the recently announced New Industry Brazil program (New Industry Brazil).
There is indeed great interest in Brazil in how Chinese investment could help reindustrialize Latin America’s even larger but increasingly smaller industrial economy. Although trade between the two countries has increased 35-fold over the past 23 years, there is an imbalance between the types of products exported by each side – mainly primary products from Brazil to China and industrialized products from China. China to Brazil. Lula has said he would like to change that, and Chinese authorities have been open to discussing the issue. Senior Brazilian officials are traveling to China to try to iron out the details of the plans that will be announced at the bilateral meeting, although it is not yet clear whether these plans will necessarily fall under the Initiative. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Although Brazil has not yet agreed to join the initiative, Lula recently said the country should examine the proposal more closely, hinting at a major announcement on the subject during President Xi’s visit . However, there is no clear indication that Lula has made his decision yet. Some in Brazil, particularly at the Foreign Ministry, are hesitant about the benefits that joining the BRI would bring – as China is already investing significantly in infrastructure projects in Brazil, given the cost of being thus perceived by the United States as having “We chose the Chinese side”, especially if Trump returns to the White House next year. To defend the idea of membership, other voices, notably among Lula’s close entourage, including the influential former Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim, emphasize that the BRI goes beyond simple investments because it includes access to an entire platform for international cooperation between countries around the world. globe. The latter position appears to be gaining ground in Brazil, but Lula appears to be hedging his bets, waiting for China to offer something else besides the invitation, such as finding ways to cooperate to expand its market to higher value-added Brazilian products. , as well as supporting Brazil’s new industrial projects at the national level and regional infrastructure projects connecting South American countries. Chinese authorities appear willing to consider Brazil’s requests, as gaining Brazilian support would provide a much-needed boost to the BRI, which faces resistance from Europe and the United States due to geopolitical concerns.
Beyond trade, bilateral cooperation extends to technological collaboration in the field of satellites (Earth-Resources Satellite project), as well as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, telecommunications (5G) and energy renewable. President Xi recently said that he sees the future of Sino-Brazil relations as a rapid evolution into new, more technologically advanced areas and, matching Brazil’s hopes, that he sees the BRI as an important instrument in efforts ongoing reindustrialization of Brazil. Likewise, it corroborated Lula’s hope to develop the “people to people” dimension of bilateral interactions. This shows that the two governments encourage exchanges between the Brazilian and Chinese people.
In addition to the G20 framework and at the bilateral level, Sino-Brazilian collaboration has also taken place in the BRICS context, particularly with regard to the coordination of new efforts to reform existing global financial and monetary structures. Indeed, although during the BRICS conference in South Africa last year, there was widespread media buzz about China and Brazil’s divisions over the proposal to expand the number of countries in the group, on key issues that the organization has faced (such as advocating for the reform of multilateral political and financial organizations towards a greater presence of members from the South), there have been more agreements than disputes between the two nations.
Sino-Brazilian relations appear ready to expand into other areas. The demand for diversification is particularly important for Brazil, which wishes to trade in products with higher added value. Nevertheless, it is gradually becoming a central element of Chinese diplomacy towards Brazil. However, we must never forget that this is not a balanced interaction and is not likely to become so. China has achieved global power status, while Brazil remains a promising emerging economy and, at best, a regional power.
There is growing interest in consolidating cooperation on both sides, but Brazil’s Lula must ensure that new bilateral projects involve technology transfer and do not result in new negative environmental and social impacts. Brazil’s reindustrialization goal, especially if realized in sustainable energy projects, could prove to be one of the most fruitful, feasible and mutually beneficial paths. Cooperation in the field of global health also appears to be a promising venue for bilateral exchanges. China has played an important role in combating the Covid crisis in Brazil, and the two countries have indicated that collaboration in this area should also be continued.
Fifty years of Sino-Brazil relations demonstrate not only economic success, but also a geopolitical convergence that has withstood challenges along the way and is now gaining ground. A more dynamic and multidimensional partnership between countries seems likely and desirable, but it is imperative that both equitable national and global inclusion guide these efforts. If Chinese and Brazilian leaders find ways to work together for a common future, there could be many lessons learned from upcoming meetings between their presidents. All eyes will be on Rio and Brasilia next month, as decisions impacting the future of these two major countries are likely to be made.
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