Indian-administered Kashmir is the northernmost part of the Indian subcontinent. “Kashmir” etymologically derives from the Sanskrit Kashmir, that is to say land parched by water. There are alternative derivations in which Kashmir means either kashyapa-mir (Kashyapa lake) or kashyapa-meru (Kashyapa mountain). It is hardly surprising that this etymological confusion conceals a much deeper historical bifurcation of a contested region. Until the mid-19th century, the term “Kashmir” referred only to the Kashmir Valley, but today (geographically), the whole of modern Kashmir includes the territories administered by India (Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh), Pakistani territories (Azad Kashmir, Gilgit-Baltistan). ) and the Aksai Chin, Trans-Karakoram Tract, held by the Chinese. I had the opportunity in 2024 to participate in a remote election observation exercise from the University of Cambridge, working closely with the NGO community during Kashmir’s first post-autonomy elections.
The modern region of what we loosely call “Kashmir” is a living enigma of postcolonial imbroglio. India calls the Pakistani-controlled territory “Pakistan-occupied Kashmir”, while Pakistan refers to the other territory as “Indian-occupied Kashmir”. In 1987, the Indian administration, fearing Pakistan, was accused of interfering in the elections in Kashmir to block independence candidates. In response, a coalition of popular parties boycotted the elections. Several leaders fled to Pakistan, where they staged an armed revolt against India. This gave rise to waves of violence and political activism beginning in the 1990s.
There are large areas of disputed territory and some shared territories under Indian and Pakistani control respectively. Neither India nor Pakistan has officially recognized the other’s membership. As expected, this made the election even more important in the minds of the parties and the people. India occupies the area “ceded” to China by Pakistan in the Trans-Karakoram territory in 1963, and Pakistan claims the entire region, excluding Aksai Chin and the Trans-Karakoram territory. Karakoram. They went to war many times. Indeed, the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947 forced the current borders, with Pakistan securing about a third of Kashmir and India half, with a demarcation line set by the UN after the Indo-Pakistani war. It’s a territorial and electoral waste. In the words of an election worker from the Electoral Commission:
The entire territory is a rich intertwining of history, cultures and politics. When you set up polling stations in local schools and regional buildings, you feel like you’re immersing yourself in a truly unique set of peoples… It’s a journey that actually feels a bit like a political accident as much as any something else, but fierce regional and ethnic loyalties largely prevent communities from saying that the territory is less than a natural geography…we are almost an accident of history…which gives the impression that we are less than the sum of our parts. We manage this electorally. We administer the outcome of this story…It is the job of the Election Commission to deploy the full authority of the election administration mandate without fear or favor. We very rarely have questions about the work of our collaborators, even in the most remote or controversial locations.
In the weeks leading up to the election, a bumper vote was widely expected to be an anti-Modi protest. It was felt that the anti-Modi elements would actually advocate voting, which would be a potential insult to Modi and give the best possible opportunity to defeat him. The elections were timely since they were the first votes since the suspension of the State five years ago. Widespread state repression followed this end to the relative political freedom enjoyed by Kashmir. “This election is important because there is complete disillusionment among the people,” said Iltija Mufti, daughter of former chief minister Mehbooba Mufti, whose party was once allied with the BJP. She continued: “We are at a crossroads in our history, people have never felt such profound alienation before. They feel powerless and dispossessed. For the Hindu Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), Kashmir was a central commitment, although it could only be imposed through anti-terrorism and anti-press laws. A village chief I spoke to described it this way:
It is nothing less than a crossroads in our history. Voters across the state see the upcoming elections as an opportunity to finally regain their voice, after years of silence about their right to vote. The Modi government had fiercely resisted holding the elections, but eventually had to relent and accept the Supreme Court’s judgment earlier this year, with a September deadline. He held on until the end and we hate him for it… We hope he gets punched in the nose. The BJP claims it will “sweep” the polls, but widespread resentment has led it to contest less than a third of the 90 Assembly seats, mostly concentrated in the Hindu-majority region of Jammu alone, and they are expected to earn less than in 2014. polls.
Despite calls for boycotts by separatist and terrorist entities, candidates from a multitude of parties, including those favoring greater independence for Kashmir, actively participated in the 2024 elections. Modi initially welcomed the elections as proof that Kashmiris have given up their aspiration for independence. Still, many feared that the Modi government would attempt to change Kashmir’s Muslim-majority demographics and were therefore eager to support their own leaders and vote. Far from showing deference to Modi’s electoral plans, they were playing him at his own game and mobilizing against the opposition.
In this case, the elections to the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly took place without too many incidents between September 18 and October 1, 2024. The polls, as in the past, were held in 3 phases to elect its 90 seats. The INDIA alliance, comprising the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (JKNC), the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Communist Party of India (CPI(M)), won a majority – some 49 of the 90 seats, with the JKNC gets the highest number. The Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) received by far the largest share of the popular vote. Foreign diplomats were allowed to observe the elections, but foreign journalists were excluded. Nevertheless, the actual conduct of the vote was relatively transparent. Local journalists reported few accounts of poor electoral practices, and domestic observers appear to have been relatively satisfied with the conduct of the National Electoral Commission. The JKNC emerged as the largest party, winning 42 seats and the BJP 29. JKNC leader Omar Abdullah became chief minister on 16 October. All parties will be relieved to know that election-related violence has been brought under control and that the Indian alliance has a strong opposition.
It remains to be seen how post-election politics might play out, especially since these post-autonomy polls offer no solution to the difficult geopolitical situation that is Kashmir. It remains a territory that is both enclave and enclave, with deep fissures that seem virtually impossible to resolve.
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