There is a general consensus within the Canadian political class that the situation of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is dire. The situation is clear: without a long-term political resurgence and a concerted national effort to rebuild its military, the country risks a permanent decline in its defense capabilities, which would significantly limit its influence in global geopolitical affairs. It is therefore somewhat paradoxical that a country of such economic stature (in 2024, Canada is ranked 9th or 10th economy in the world, depending on the source), whose prosperity is largely based on international trade and the stability of global systems, risks a decline in defense capabilities. Canada’s economy is highly interconnected with the global market, and maintaining a stable international environment is essential to maintaining and developing these trading relationships. A reduction in defense readiness could undermine its ability to contribute to and benefit from the global order that supports its economic prosperity.
Unfortunately, despite these geopolitical needs, there are growing gaps in the structure and capabilities of the CAF that go beyond simple funding issues. NATO’s target of 2 percent of GDP for military spending alone cannot resolve these structural crises, and with nearly half of Canada’s military equipment “unusable,” according to a Department of Defense report, National Defense, the country’s allies are aware that they cannot count on Canadian military support for the foreseeable future.
According to Canadian Defense Minister Bill Blair, government restrictions on defense spending have led to a “death spiral” in recruiting, and the country’s lack of preparedness for the changing dynamics of modern warfare has made it made vulnerable. “The first responsibility of any government is the national defense of its country, and we simply must do more to defend Canada’s interests around the world as the nature of war evolves,” he added:
Our potentially hostile adversaries are investing in capabilities that could threaten us, and the best way to respond to this risk is to prepare and build resilience and readiness. As I said, increasing production is a deterrent, and being prepared is a deterrent.
On paper, the situation seems critical. The CAF is short at least 16,000 troops, or about 15 percent of its authorized strength of 71,500 Regular Force members and 30,000 Primary Reserve members. The findings of the aforementioned DND report are very concerning: on average, only 45 percent of Canada’s air fleet is operational, while the Royal Canadian Navy can operate at 46 percent capacity and the army at 54 percent. . This crisis stems from a combination of factors, including the declining attractiveness of military careers, recent sexual misconduct scandals, and direct and indirect violations of the laws of armed conflict during operations in Afghanistan. Finding policy solutions to these problems could take decades.
These alarming figures highlight the extent to which Canada is lagging behind its allies in a period of severe geopolitical instability and the threat of armed conflict in several global theaters. “While Canada sleeps,” as one NATO ambassador put it, our allies are preparing for the eventualities of future war while facing a gray zone conflict. Tired of our promises and sermons, they see our 2 percent announcement at NATO’s 75th anniversary summit in Washington for what it is: improvised damage control with no real commitment,” writes Colin Robertson in Canadian Politics and Public Policy magazine.
One might infer that this is a sign of national apathy, perhaps linked to the fact that Canada has never experienced a foreign war on its own soil since becoming an independent state in 1867. However, polls indicate that public interest in this issue is growing. in recent years, particularly in light of global geopolitical tensions. A 2023 Ipsos poll found that 75% of Canadians believe defense spending should increase to ensure the country can protect its territory and sovereignty.
This change in attitude appears to be driven by concerns over international events such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (cited by 71% of respondents) and China’s assertive actions in the Taiwan Strait (69 %). Despite this, many Canadians remain critical of the state of the Canadian Armed Forces, with 56% describing them as “old and outdated.”
Although the hypothesis of geopolitical self-destruction through denial of reality cannot be completely ruled out, until proven otherwise, it is important that Canadian decision-makers focus on identifying and responding to the urgent needs of the nation in terms of defense. Several Canadian experts have already taken steps in this direction, proposing a defense model that prioritizes air and naval capabilities, particularly in light of Canada’s Arctic territories and its maritime borders, which face potential threats from the share of Russia and China.
“Climate change is rapidly reshaping Canada and our North,” Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said during a televised news conference from Canadian Forces Base Trenton, Ontario, last April. A new approach was outlined in Canada’s updated defense policy, Our North, Strong and Free, the same month, which emphasizes investments in Arctic defense in response to growing risks to security in the region. “Our Arctic is now warming four times more than the global average, making a vast and sensitive region more accessible to foreign actors with growing regional military capabilities and ambitions,” the document highlights.
This strategic change gains even more legitimacy if we consider the expectations of Canada’s powerful neighbor, the United States, which is counting on Canada to assume its responsibilities within NORAD. But the country has only a dozen operational fighter jets available for immediate response, three to four aging frigates that can be deployed at a time, and just one obsolete submarine. Multiple sources, including the experts cited above, confirm this sad reality. In addition to NORAD obligations, Canada must also contribute to NATO, an alliance that underwent a significant recalibration following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Despite their enhanced forward presence agreement with Latvia, NATO allies are acutely aware of the current unreliability of Canada’s strategic military response structures.
The current state of Canada’s Air and Navy plans, particularly the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) (eFP) program, addresses some of the critical defense needs noted above, but faces challenges. significant delays. The Royal Canadian Navy is building 15 River-class destroyers to replace its aging Halifax-class frigates and Iroquois-class destroyers. The first of these ships is not expected to enter service until the mid-2030s, and the last ship is expected to be completed around 2050. This timeline has raised concerns about the Navy’s ability to maintain operational readiness during the interim period. .
Concerning the Canadian Army (CA), the probability of large-scale land operations on Canadian soil remains extremely low. Such operations over the next 10 to 15 years would most likely involve Russia, taking place approximately 6,000 to 7,000 kilometers from Canada (e.g. the 6,500 km distance between Ottawa and Riga, referring to the mission of reinforced forward presence in Latvia). Therefore, the focus should be on maintaining an expeditionary force with a manageable logistics and maintenance footprint, incorporating key lessons from the Donbas conflict. These lessons include finding the right balance between mobility and protection (both active and passive) and firepower, the widespread use of drones and roaming munitions, the need for strong defensive and offensive cyber capabilities. electronic warfare and the critical role of indirect fire. which proved to be the main cause of losses on both sides.
For example, operational feedback highlights the vulnerability of the M777 towed artillery systems deployed to Latvia in 2022, while heavily armored and tracked systems present their own challenges. In addition to focusing on artillery, the Canadian Army (CA), which will likely not receive budgetary priority due to its focus on the Far North, will need to seek solutions that provide optimal cost control. . This approach would involve the adoption of “controlled sophistication” – the development of systems advanced enough to compete with potential adversaries but with a unit cost that allows the acquisition of a significantly larger quantity of systems under a given budget. Building mass would provide greater resilience to the attrition typical of high-intensity warfare, a critical factor of strategic success that Western militaries have largely neglected in recent decades.
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