As a former colony of the United States, linked to later neocolonial relations and the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951, the Philippines plays a key role in American foreign policy at a time when the United States is focused on the growing influence of China and the United States. escalation of territorial conflicts in the region. Today, military cooperation with the Philippines is also paramount for the United States, given the termination of the 1947 U.S.-Philippines Military Bases Agreement (MBA) and the need for a new strategic approach integrating China’s economic and strategic growth. The 2025 elections will determine who fills more than 18,000 positions, including the configuration of the Philippine Congress – which influences the country’s foreign policy and sanctions defense programs. This will also pave the way for the next presidential election in 2028, when current President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. leaves office.
The US “pivot to Asia” or “rebalance” became a buzzword after US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton first announced it at the ASEAN Regional Forum in 2010, in Hanoi, then during the “Pacific Century of America”, in 2010. Foreign policy (2013). The United States’ pivot to Asia is a shift in focus of Middle East foreign policy to attempt to balance China’s growing influence and the threat of North Korea. Although primarily diplomatic and economic in nature (Graham 2013), the catalyst for change has not only been the reduction of US regional power, but also China’s more assertive approach and actions, particularly in the Sea of Southern China. This has revived US involvement in the region and strengthened the voices of some US regional allies who perceive China as a peril rather than a partner. China’s growing geopolitical importance has prompted the United States to strengthen its position, balancing and engaging with China.
In the period of the pivot to Asia and the post-bases era, the security relationship between the United States and the Philippines has expanded and extended into Philippine politics. The geopolitical strategic interests of the United States require that the 2025 elections produce politicians and leaders who continually support and commit to the major permanent military cooperation agreements between the two states, particularly the Agreement on Visiting Forces (VFA) of 1998. Implemented in 1999, the VFA paved the way for a series of uninterrupted annual activities shoulder Military exercises (“shoulder to shoulder”), notable in 2001, 2016, 2022, 2023 and 2024, between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the United States Army.
Training exercises and war games have become an important part of the military and civil security relationship between the United States and the Philippines. shoulder was designed to strengthen bilateral interoperability, capabilities, test air and missile defense systems, increase maritime security awareness, trust and cooperation. The near cancellation of the VFA in 2020 by then-President Duterte, as the Philippines’ foreign policy, and during President Trump’s first term, shifted toward China and away from the United States , testifies to the direct impact of political leadership on the nature of the country’s foreign policy.
In addition to the VFA, the Philippines adopted the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) as a supplementary agreement to two previous agreements – the MDT of 1951 and the VFA of 1998. The EDCA agreement, lasting ten years, allows the United States to have a strengthened presence in the Philippines. This agreement, however, was challenged by civil society organizations and legal experts before the Philippine Supreme Court (PSC) because it tolerates the United States rotating its troops in the Philippines for an extended stay and allows them to construct and operate facilities on Philippine bases for the United States and the Philippines. Philippine Armed Forces. While opposition groups and parties argue that the EDCA contravenes the Philippine constitutional provision on the establishment of a permanent foreign military base, the PSC has ruled otherwise and definitively, affirming that the EDCA is constitutional in its 2016 decision.
The slow implementation of the EDCA during the term of then President Duterte (June 2016-June 2022) was deliberate due to Duterte’s influence over the air base (Palawan); White Air Base (Pampanga); Benito Ebuen Air Base (Cebu); Fort Magsaysay (Pampanga); and Lumbia Airport (Golden Cagayan). With the post-Duterte foreign policy shift, President Marcos Jr. expanded EDCA sites, covering four additional new bases in 2023, a year after assuming the presidency. Additional sites are located in Northern Luzon facing Taiwan (Republic of China), three and one in Palawan facing the SCS. These are Camp Melchora Dela Cruz (Gamu, Isabela); King-lo Airport (King-lo, Cagayan); Camilo Osias Naval Base (Santa Ana, Cagayan); and Balabac Island (Palawan).
The unilateral selection and identification of EDCA bases without the participation of those on the ground was poorly received by local government officials. Isabela and Cagayan provincial governors were collectively offended by the national government’s choice to make their provinces EDCA armed bases as they become potential magnets for Chinese missile and nuclear attacks and could be caught in the crossfire by American and Chinese armed forces. rivalry. Civil society organizations and groups have also raised the alarm over human rights violations and land confiscation of indigenous peoples following the hosting of EDCA military activities and training. Naturally, non-participation of local government and community leaders in the political process of charting their future in a large-scale project like the EDCA military-civilian project will not only isolate the program from the people, but also produce conflicting relationships between state and national governments. international actors on the one hand, and governments and local communities on the other.
U.S. geopolitical interest in the region cannot be separated from economic goals, especially as China has become the primary trading partner of most Asian countries, replacing the historical primacy of Asian state ties. -United and the West and thus helping Beijing to establish strong ties with a number of countries. States. The Lowy Institute’s 2023 report (Patton and Sato 2023) concludes that China has been more influential than the United States in four categories: economic relations, defense networks, diplomatic influence, and cultural influence. Of the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the United States is the most influential power in only two: the Philippines and Singapore.
Given China’s growing economic presence in the region, the United States wants to provide a counterbalance. By increasing trade, investment and development assistance, the United States aims to provide the Philippines with an alternative to Chinese investments under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In May 2022, the Philippines and the United States joined 12 other partners to launch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) to strengthen economic partnership on: trade; supply chains; clean energy, decarbonization and infrastructure; and taxation and fight against corruption. And much more through Global Infrastructure and Investment (GIP) to support IPEF’s economies, human capital and sustainable development goals.
In terms of trade and investment, the relationship between the United States and the Philippines is relatively strong: $22.6 billion in total merchandise trade in 2023 and approximately $10.6 billion in services trade in 2022 The United States is also the country’s largest export market and one of the country’s largest export markets. the largest foreign investors. In 2024, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce brought 22 U.S. companies to the Philippines to explore business opportunities, resulting in billion-dollar investment pledges. Any change in the current environment – whether the Philippine political system or otherwise – would be deeply concerning and troubling for U.S. investors, as it could affect their business future in the country.
Marcos Jr.’s statement in his 2023 State of the Nation Address that “our independent foreign policy – friend to all and enemy to none – has proven effective” is obviously out of touch with reality, as his foreign policy is biased in favor of the United States. interests. The elected officials of 2025 could give us the first signs as to whether the path forward will be one of continued alignment with the United States or that of a rapprochement of the Philippines towards China’s sphere of influence. The United States could therefore view these elections as a way to support candidates and policies that align with its long-term vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”
References
Clinton, H. (2013). The American Pacific Century. Available at https://Hillary Clinton: America’s Pacific Century and the Pivot to Asia
Graham E. (2013). “Southeast Asia in the US Rebalancing: Perceptions of a Divided Region”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 35, (3) p. 305-332 (28 pages): ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute
Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines; August 30, 1951. Available Project Avalon – Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines; August 30, 1951
Patton S. and Sato J. (2023). “Asia Power Snapshot: China and the United States in Southeast Asia,” available at https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/API%20Snapshot%20PDF%20v3.pdf
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