The war in Ukraine, now in its third year, has from the start as a moral confrontation – the dominant story being that of a sovereign democracy resisting the revisionism of an authoritarian Russian state seeking to recover the lost grandeur of its former empire. A crisis that could have been contained has been transformed into an prolonged war, with devastating consequences for Ukraine and the corrosive effects on European cohesion. As the conflict takes place, what appears more and more, it is a mixture of ideological inertia, strategic deficit and political avoidance – again masked by categorical declarations which deepen the dead end.
The question was never whether Ukraine had the right to choose its alliances. The real problem was whether this right could be exercised, secure and supported without triggering a war that the West could neither enter directly nor put an end to a decisive end. As early as 2022, membership of Ukraine NATO was politically unsuitable – a fact recognized by the Western leaders themselves. However, the discourse of “freedom of choice” has persisted, as if the invocation of rights alone could dictate political decisions, rather than a realistic evaluation of the situation.
As Noam Chomsky rightly observed, the great powers invoke an order based on rules while using to force wherever their interests require it. The case of the Solomon Islands is indicative: in 2022, when this small state of the Pacific signed a security agreement with China, the US officials expressed themselves by its strategic implications – an ever vocabulary applied to the much more important efforts of Ukraine.
Realistic thinkers – from Mearsheimer and Walt to Morgenthau and Kissinger – had long warned that power ultimately determines the behavior of the state. However, the liberal hegemonic project, based on the conviction that liberal democracy should develop on a global scale and would be welcomed by all rational actors, came to dominate. The war has been reduced to a binary framework of good against evil, deliberately putting the implementation alongside the complexities of history, geopolitics and the balance of powers.
Dissent has been delegitimized and diplomacy was pushed to the margins. The first opportunities – pre -war negotiations at Istanbul talks in spring 2022 – were reserved in favor of maximum pressure and the conviction that Russia could be permanently weakened. A more flexible approach, including a serious commitment to proposals for Ukrainian neutrality or conditional security guarantees, could have opened a space for de -escalation. Instead, war has become a waiting scheme, without a coherent plan – a conflict prolonged by narrative coherence rather than by strategic conception. But international policy is not a courtroom; It is an area of protest, where principles must coexist with power and prudence. The idea that a war could be waged in Europe without strategic recalibration, de -escalation incentives or serious commitment to the opponent is a deep failure of diplomacy.
This criticism does not dorm up Russia. The invasion was a blatant violation of international law and an act of brutal force. However, European decisions were not based on a structured strategy based on real conditions, and they were not adjusted as the circumstances have evolved – and this was an essential weakness. European leaders assumed that structural constraints could be rejected and that the political posture of the United States would remain unchanged. The largely recognized possibility of Trump’s return was treated as rhetorical speculation, not as a scenario that justified planning. When this scenario materialized, Europe reacted with a shock – not because Trump’s position was unknown, but because of its own strategic imprecision.
As 2025 takes place, European leaders recalibrate their approach – but even these adjustments retain traces of illusion. The United States no longer offering a white check, the European landscape is becoming more and more chaotic. The expression of starmer “boots in the field, airplanes in the air” can project determination, but neither Great Britain nor France have the capacity to shape developments by themselves. Rhetorical confidence remains, but its geopolitical foundations are deeply questionable. Europe aspires to play the lion – but it has no claws.
Even if peace becomes an undeniable imperative, Europe is faced with an unresolved dilemma. The perception of Russia as a permanent and existential threat to European security has now prevailed. However, treat it as such in all areas may cement the confrontation and distort the post-war security architecture.
At a deeper level, the war in Ukraine has become a mirror exposing internal contradictions of Europe. The continent is struggling to articulate a coherent strategic response in the midst of divergent national approaches: the anxieties of the Baltic States, the reluctance of the South, the Franco-British rivalry and asymmetrical economic interests. In this fragmented geopolitical environment, the formulation and endurance of a unified policy seem uncertain. Temporary collaborations – the so -called “Coalitions of the Willing” – in the name of the sovereign law of Ukraine to choose its allies are, by all accounts, an improbable path to a viable solution. The presence of NATO forces on Ukrainian soil has always been a red line for Russia – and taking into account the developments on the battlefield, Moscow has no incitement to accept it.
At the same time, the potential expansion of this model in the discussions on the defense of Europe could trigger deeper rifts within the EU, especially if it implies the participation of Turkey – a scenario which would be confronted with strong opposition of states like Greece and Cyprus, given the longtime tensions with Ankara, which these states consider a direct strategic threat. This fragmentation is not simply institutional; It reflects a deeper failure of vision and coordination.
As Steve Witkoff recently said, a prerequisite for the end of the war is to clearly define the ultimate goal – to know where you want to go, so that you can shape the means to get there. We must also understand the aspirations of all the parties involved, in order to reach a solution with which everyone can live. However, this solution still seems distant. The question is how destruction will precede it – and what new dangers can emerge in the event of a calm judgment and what good will does not prevail. For Europe, the real test lies not only at the end of the war, but in what type of order emerges after it – and if the lessons of this war can finally produce strategic maturity.
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