While we are entering the third decade of the 21st century, our world is taken between the old hegemonic introspective powers, namely the American and European states, and the new hesitant emerging, such as China and other rising powers. This situation creates systemic chaos and uncertainty, a result of which is the wave of right -wing authoritarianism in global policy. This authoritarian epidemic is not rooted in the personalities or psychologies of Trump, Putin Modi, Erdogan or Orban, but under underlying conditions, long-term historical factors that affect the global economic system and the balance of changing power. Trump, Erdogan and others in the “Ring of Autocrat” are less creators than the outcome of prolonged economic, social and political processes.
Of course, in all these countries, there are local and / or national conditions that prepare the land for such authoritarian overvoltages on the right. However, in the final analysis, all these right -wing changes are the results of an increasingly volatile and chaotic international situation, which is the direct consequence of a process of what Giovanni Arrighi called the “ hegemonic transition ” in a system of systemic chaos, where “ the Hegemonic State (or a group of states) incumbent on the conduct of the hegemonic state (or group of states).
Erdoğan Turk is the only far -right leader in a competitive electoral landscape that has maintained a 23 -year -old uninterrupted occupation rule. He faced several electoral victories, uprisings and attempted coup against him, who failed to win his regime. He canceled electoral victories but always kept the competitive game afterwards. The Taksim Gezi demonstrations of 2013, recognized as the most important uprising against the Erdogan regime to date, have not established coherent leadership or a unified program to offer a real alternative to replace the existing regime. Although the current demonstrations are not yet as important as Gezi Park’s demonstrations, they present people’s resilience. They also remind the global community that the struggle can continue, even after 23 years of far -right leadership.
The popular mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem İmaMoğlu, the most likely Erdoğan rival, was imprisoned on the allegations of unabashed corruption linked to the management of the mayor’s office in Istanbul, and the objective of the government remains to prevent it from participating in the next presidential elections in 2028. The next president, but because it would indicate the cessation of all avenues Erdoğan by electoral means. The Turkish population understands the importance of electoral competition, they therefore protest to protect this critical aspect of formal democracy. Similar to the manifestations of Taksim Gezi, which began as an environmental movement and have evolved into a broader national uprising, the current situation has significant potential. Currently, university students direct the demonstrations, and the pressure of students and the general public have forced the opposition party normally careful to agree to organize public demonstrations in the streets.
Although there is currently no unified agenda, activists who disrupt orchestrated speeches and plead for a general strike, as well as their long publications of social media and well designed, suggest aspirations that simply go beyond electoral competitiveness. İMamoğlu and other current opposition leaders have no clear vision to keep the country away from the disastrous course in which it has been for 45 years, characterized by a deeply unfair neoliberal development. The Erdoğan regime has not deviated policies that have aggressively promoted neoliberalism in Türkiye since 1980; Instead, he intensified them.
The neoliberal restructuring in Türkiye began in 1980 with a set of economic stabilization, commonly known as the decision of January 24. “This package, created by Turbut Özal in consultation with the IMF, marked an important turning point in the economic history of Turkey, and the Turkish economy opened up to global influences with this package. Consequently, Turkey has adopted a neoliberal restructuring with strategies oriented towards growth and external loans. These policies aimed to remove the revenues of public services, benefiting workers and redirect them to international creditors, transnational companies operating in the region and local allies within the power elite.
As expected, popular manifestations and general disorders appeared against these policies, leading to violent violence by the State. Eight months after the introduction of the reform package on January 24, 1980, a military coup eliminated the democratic process, dissolved all political and unions parties and took complete control on September 12 to facilitate the rapid execution of neoliberal reforms by repressing any dissent. The reign of soldiers from 1980 to 1983 advanced these neoliberal reforms with force. General Evren explained in 1991 how he saw the role of the coup in relation to the decisions of January 24:
If we did not intervene after the stabilization package of January 24, I have no doubt that none of the proposals for economic reform could have been implemented. It is only when we, the army, intervened and ensured the stability that the conditions were prepared for the implementation of the program.
In social terms, neoliberal restructuring has been associated with Sunni Islam supported by the State and religious education to counter the rise of left movements and union activism in the late 1970s. From the mid -1980s, Islamist right -wing parties constantly increased their share of votes to the elections.
Many Protestant students acknowledge that the replacement of Impoğlu by Erdoğan will not solve structural problems. The recent opposition strategy “Erdogan’s Enemy is my friend” turned out to be ineffective because of its lack of coherent economic plan and foreign policy management. However, if Erdoğan manages to silence the opposition completely, preventing the whole opposition from standing against him, this will create an environment where no one else can prosper. Turkish democracy already had trouble when the main challenger in Erdoğan, the mayor of Istanbul, İmaMoğlu, was arrested on what many believe they are fabricated accusations. This incident is however significant in itself. This situation has intensified because it sparked large -scale demonstrations in Türkiye, recalling Gezi Park demonstrations, 12 years earlier.
Several political scientists and sociologists argue that in the second decade of the AKP regime, Turkey has gone from a tutelary democracy to a competitive authoritarian regime. These studies, based on the framework of Levinsky and Loxton which highlights the catalytic role played by the election of populist leaders in the rise of competitive authoritarianism, describe hybrid regimes where democratic institutions are always considered as the main means of obtaining and exercising abused power so often and with such an extensive measure. There were 35 competitive authoritarian schemes in 2010, according to Levitsky and Way’s work Competitive authoritarianism: hybrid regimes after the Cold War. Some have adopted democratic practices, others have descended into authoritarianism, and some have continued as competitive authoritarian regimes. “Some democratized competitive authoritarian regimes (including Peru, Slovakia and Taiwan), while others have hardened in complete authoritarianism (such as Belarus, Cambodia and Russia). Still others (including Albania, Benin and Ukraine) went back and forth between democracy and competitive authoritarianism.
It is now obvious that the liberal international order is faced with significant challenges. The fundamental structures of this order undergo substantial changes, which makes largely vain restoration efforts. The collapse of this system is painful for the Western elites that built it and harvested various advantages. Trump, Modi, Orban and Erdogan are less creators than the result of prolonged economic, social and political processes. It would be a mistake to think that the so-called liberal order is in difficulty only because of the rhetoric or the policies of Orban or Erdogan. In fact, more fundamental problems are at stake, which explains why these autocrats have managed to challenge an order that benefits from almost universal support among the elites of foreign policy in the West.
The problem for Turkey at this critical point in history is structural and historical. The current junction represents a particularly dismal chapter in the history of Turkey which shows all the features of the economic crisis and political exhaustion. The problem is not only the AKP or its leader, Erdogan. The appeal of the opposition block, “ anyone except Erdogan ”, seems clear and direct, but it is not only simplistic but deceptive, reducing the deep structural problems of Turkey to a simple personal staff.
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