Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney argued that Canada should consider acquiring Saab Gripen instead of the F-35, as this would reduce the American leverage on Canadian defense policy. The idea was repeated by a number of Canadian commentators and political outfits who claim that the acquisition of the F-35 compromises Canadian sovereignty, while Gripen’s purchase offers strategic autonomy. This argument seems attractive – until you spend five minutes to see how the industrial defense base and the related supply chains work in the real world. Once you have done this, the idea that Gripen offers geopolitical independence is revealed for what it is – not only nonsense, but also nonsense.
The Gripen has always taken advantage of a kind of prestige of the Outsider. Light, agile, cheaper than its competitors, it was considered the intelligent choice for countries that do not want to be taken in the gravitational attraction of Washington or Brussels. On paper, it looks great: modern sensors, electronic war capacities, Stol performance and ability to operate from remote landing or improvised. It is easy to see why he has his fans. None of this changes the fact that the Gripen E works on an American engine: the General Electric F414-Ge-39e. It is the same engine that feeds the super hornet of the American navy. It is made in the United States and subject to the same American export controls as any other military component manufactured in the United States. This means that Washington can oppose its veto to any Gripen sale, at any country, at any time. And he has.
At the beginning of 2025, Colombia was preparing to acquire Gripen E. Saab’s offer was strong – expensive, technically capable and adapted to the airspace and the operational needs of Colombia. They even included incentives to develop the local industry. But as the agreement approached the finalization, the word disclosed that the US government intended to block the export of the F414 engine. And just like that, everything collapsed. It was not a bureaucratic delay or a paperwork problem. It is Washington who exercises his legal authority under international traffic regulations in arms – and he killed the agreement.
It is not a single-off. The Tejas MKII of India, which also uses F414, is under the same set of export restrictions. The Gripen of Brazil program is also. Even if these jets are assembled in São Paulo instead of Linköping, Washington still gets a word to say where they can be sold. Each plane which relies on a component manufactured in the United States – in particular something as critical as an engine – is, by definition, not entirely sovereign.
The idea that Canada can somehow get around the American influence by choosing the Gripen on the second batch of F-35 is a pure fantasy, especially since Ottawa has already bought and paid for the first 16 of the 88 fighters planned. The two jets count on the industrial basis of American defense. The two are tangled in the American supply chains. Both are limited by Itar. The only real difference is that the F -35 is delivered with integrated integration with NATO allies, common logistics and a solid support pipeline, while Gripen is with more isolation – and no longer offers autonomy.
Sweden is still proud of its independent defense posture. SAAB is a symbol of this tradition – a legacy of the Cold War of neutrality supported by credible indigenous production. But this model is not lined up cleanly in the 21st century. Today, hunting jets are complex multinational systems. No one builds everything internally. And Saab’s decision to use an American engine in its flagship export fighter has indeed gave a veto to its sales in the United States. It is a decision that made sense from a technical point of view and costs, but it came with political consequences.
What is striking is the number of people in Ottawa – and now in the Prime Minister’s office – does not seem to understand this. Defense policy is not only to select a platform. It is a question of understanding the ecosystems in which these platforms are integrated. The F-35 can be delivered with a significant price, but at least it comes with a network. The Gripen does not buy you from sovereignty; It bought you the illusion. You always depend on the Washington permission shift, only now you do not have the operational advantages that came inside the tent – and align the upper fighter.
This is the biggest problem with the Gripen argument. It reflects a kind of magic thinking which is far too common in Canadian defense debates: that we can somehow buy the sovereignty of the shelf, that the right decision to supply us from the realities of our alliances and dependencies. This is not how it works. If Canada wants real strategic autonomy, it will have to invest in its own industrial basis. This means propulsion, ammunition, maintaining maintenance and integration of systems. And that will never happen. The illusion that Canada can achieve the same lens simply by choosing a Swedish jet – powered by an American engine – is not just an illusion, it is an illusion.
The truth is uncomfortable but simple. Canada’s air power is, and in the foreseeable future, will be linked to American -based American defense and therefore subject to American laws and regulations. It is not a bug – it is a characteristic of the Western ecosystem of defense -industrial. The F-35 makes this relationship explicit. Gripen obscures him, but he doesn’t change it.
The suggestion of Prime Minister Carney that Gripen’s purchase instead of the F-35 will prevent Canada from Washington claws is simply not credible. Worse, it promotes a false feeling of freedom where it does not exist. If Ottawa will defend seriously, it has to face strategic reality – not romantic myths on neutrality and independence that were obsolete there is a generation. Canada does not need another big gesture. He needs capacity, clarity and a defense policy anchored in the functioning of the world.
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