Interview – David Galbreath Trendy Blogger

David J. Galbreath is a professor of war and technology in the Department of Policy, Languages ​​and International Studies at the University of Bath. His research focuses on how technology shapes the way we think and wage war. He also did research on European security for European soldiers and the transatlantic relationship with the resurgence of Russia and the war in Ukraine. His current research concerns what digital innovation tells us about the future of war. He was editor European security (2008-2015), Defense studies (2014-2016), and deputy editor-in-chief of European International Security Journal (2016-2020). He is the co-editor (with John Deni, Us Army War College) of Routledge Handbook of Defense Studies (2019). With Aaron Brantly (Virginia Tech) and Manabrata Guha (Australian National University), he co-publishing Handbook Routledge on war and technology (future).

Where do you see the most exciting research / debates occur in your field?

Understanding our relationship with technology is something that I want to understand and I think that a large part of literature in environmental philosophy is a way of thinking about trying to conceptualize this and perhaps understanding it. I think that as a whole, understanding international relations as something that includes things outside or before, human experience will be important in the future.

How does the way you understand the world has changed over time, and what (or that) caused the most important changes in your thought?

My understanding of the world continued to change as time, space and decision -making continued to be criticized in smaller pieces, which Paul Virilio speaks as fundamentals to “pure war”. But, I think it was my fortuitous meeting with Ruth Miller’s book, Snarl: to defend traffic at neutral and defective networksThis first drew my attention a different way of understanding international relations as beyond policies, agents and institutions. Miller has shown that our inability to think about networks outside of ourselves means that networks will always fail. I see that it repeats itself all the time in IR.

Could the approach of President Trump on the use of pressure and coercion could be more effective than traditional diplomacy? How could this have an impact on long-term stability in regions like Ukraine?

I think it’s a busy question. The Trump administration can be able to do what others could not / or have sought to do, but it is not the same thing to ask if Trump will do what the Biden administration would have sought but could not. Trump as a negotiator has always been transactional and oriented towards power. I don’t think we should see this not part of “traditional diplomacy”. Beyond a closely defined idea of ​​what the United States can obtain from a peace agreement, I am not sure that Trump and Biden can be considered together. They have a different understanding of the functioning of the world and the function of the world.

With countries like China and India that continue trade with Russia, how do you see the balance between economic interests and geopolitical objectives to shape global affairs?

We have never seen a moment in international relations when economic interests and geopolitical objectives do not shape global affairs. See how the United States has militarized the national economy as a national interest in the Cold War. China and India continue to trade with Russia because they can and do not consider Ukraine as being linked to their own national security or their interests. I suspect that there has been a certain dismay in Beijing and Delhi to know why the United States continues to find Ukraine in its own national interest, although it clearly begins to change under the Trump administration which has shown that Ukraine and Europe are not in the American national interest. So I would say that Chinese and Indian trade with Russia is as usual and not a warning sign of a great change in international relations.

You discuss the concept of “Franter” within NATOThe United States bearing a disproportionate part of the alliance defense costs. Are European nations too dependent on the United States, or was it a reasonable arrangement given the circumstances?

The freeride of European governments on American power can be seen in two ways. The first is that European governments have rationally determined that they can spend as a percentage of GDP less in defense than during the Cold War, because their direct territorial security is less, but security is generally required. The American army then becomes as insurance.

The second way to think about it is “the American Empire”, as Michael Cox spoke about it in his 2004 International Studies Review article. European governments are taken between the United States which endeavors supremacy in international relations while seeking to be considered as loyal parts of the Empire. As long as the imperial “principle” believes that the Empire works for them, the “agents” controlled will benefit from the imperial good of security and defense without speaking of the trade and shared values. However, once the principle begins to think that the Empire does not work for them, the agents are taken between seeking to show their value to the Empire while preparing for the moment when these imperial goods are no longer available. Be that as it may, European governments are in a delicate position.

You do the trick That the United States is now focusing on the fight against China rather than the defense of Europe. How do you think that this reorientation will have an impact on global security, especially for small countries that depend on American power for protection?

A classic challenge in realism for states with and without being able to know whether to balance or blur. If we think that these are the only two options, then the small European states must seek to mark the power of major European states, even if these major European states are themselves drifting with the probable end of the transatlantic safety community. Before this happens, however, large and small European governments will seek to reassure the Trump administration that US national interests are served by a European train. If that does not succeed, we will probably see the development of a European security treaty organization that will seek to bring together large and small states to recreate a multinational force which resembles many structures and standard operational procedures of NATO.

With European leaders planning to increase support for UkraineWhat challenges of the EU is faced with the balance between security interests with the risk of new escalation with Russia?

In the current state of things, the EU does not have much to worry in terms of antagonization of Russia. First, European support for Ukraine is largely bilateral, between the EU or NATO and Ukraine member states. The second is that the United Kingdom and Norway remain outside the EU which are both NATO member states. Consequently, a probable solution will be to create a whole new organization of security treaties which includes all the European Member States of NATO. Naturally, a key aspect that is also lacking is the future of Canada in any organization treated if the United States withdraws from NATO or changing the treaty to remove the collective defense clause from NATO article V. Anyway, I don’t think the EU will be at the center of Russia’s concerns, but rather everything that comes after NATO.

Is an American security net essential to guarantee the safety of Europe in the long term, or can Europe develop an autonomous defense capacity in itself?

European soldiers do not have the weapons systems necessary to punish Russians in Ukraine in the same way as American weapons and systems. While Europeans have given Ukraine more in terms of help and weapons, the United States had an overwhelming impact on the front line and beyond in Ukraine and Russia. The Americans offered much clearer weapons than Europeans. This means that any European defensive alliance will have to develop similar weapons systems and that it is difficult to imagine before 2040 if not even later.

Take for example the “Future Fire” program of the British army which sought to seek an artillery weapon system which would be adapted to 2040, but instead, the British army accepted the RCH 155 which is not only available currently, but is already in action in Ukraine, although the variant of the British army is different (using the boxer pilot module). Despite the best efforts in the British army, he will have to offer a new budgetary line for future fires for 2040. Planning the future is difficult when the investment in defense was left to decomposition outside the great operations of the ex-Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. And this can be applied to all European soldiers.

What are the prospects for more in -depth integration of European defense forces? Could a unified European soldier better approach emerging threats such as cyber war and instability?