While Sino -American relations deteriorate, Taiwan’s question has become an increasingly dangerous flash point – which, according to some analysts, could even trigger a third world war. The dominant Western account led by the United States launched the “fourth crisis of the Taiwan Strait” as the product of the expansion military power of continental China and the “alleged authoritarian tower”, illustrated by its treatment of Hong Kong and its allegedly coercive posture towards Taiwan. In this context, a continental “invasion” is treated as the logical, almost inevitable result of Sino-American rivalry. Conversely, Taiwan is represented as a lonely democracy courageously resisting an authoritarian threat, his own policy of largely ignored cross -transfer; Taipei appears only a passive target. Paradoxically, although Western discourse often presents in Taiwan as an “independent state”, it simultaneously strips Taiwan from the agency – even if Taipei’s political choices decisively shape the stability of cross traits.
Before analyzing the triangular dynamics between the United States, continental China and Taiwan, the historical nature of the dispute must be clarified. Unlike the representation of the United States in force of a major power aimed at invading an independent small neighbor, post -war instruments – Cairo declaration, Potsdam’s declaration and the dissemination of Hirohito – repressed sovereignty on Taiwan in China. After the defeat of Japan, the Chinese civil war resumed; The Republic of China led by Kuomintang withdrew to Taiwan after his defeat by the Chinese Communist Party. Because no peace treaty has never been signed, the two parties remain, of swear, in a state of civil war.
With regard to the legal status of Taiwan, the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China are sovereignty over the whole of China, including Taiwan and the continent. The United Nations designates Taiwan as “a province of China” and the Arbitral Prize for the 2016 Southern China Sea described its administration as “the Taiwanese authority of China Taiwan Authority in China”. Globally, 180 states maintain diplomatic relations with the PRC: some accept the principle of China (explicitly recognizing the sovereignty of RPC on Taiwan), while others, in particular the United States, adopt a more ambiguous policy in a single Chinese – considering the claim of Beijing without officially recognizing it and formal Taiwanese independence.
The dispute is therefore one of contested sovereignty, and not the case of an independent state faced with foreign aggression. Reunification remained the main of Beijing since the Roc government withdrew to Taiwan. In the 1990s, under Jiang Zemin, the continent’s policy went from the defense of the armed “liberation” to the promotion of peaceful reunification – a position that has largely persisted. In this broader strategy of peaceful reunification, the continent has pinned its hopes on the inhabitants of Taiwan while focusing on its own modernization and economic growth. The premise is that by becoming economically advanced and by promoting Taiwan’s dependence on the continent – supported by shared historical and cultural links – Taiwan will be attracted by reunification. Completing this “carrot” is a “stick”: the signals of Beijing, it will intensify military activity and diplomatic pressure if Taipei continues the independence of jure.
The coercive and intimidating measures which now attribute to Beijing have in fact occurred before. The dynamics involve three movements, which mark the interactions of American China-Taiwan. First, a crisis is triggered when Taiwanese leaders put pressure for the independence of jure, causing continental military and diplomatic pressures. Second, the United States intervenes, reaffirming its policy in a single China and urging Taipei to stop provocative initiatives. This dynamic began under Lee Teng-Hui (1988-2000), which defined the links between the features as a “state state of state” relationship, and continued under Chen Shui-Bian (2000-2008), which promoted independence measures such as referendums and an offer of membership in the UN. The two episodes caused an increase in military activity on the continent; In each case, the United States – in particular under the Bush administration – has coined by the problem with the continent against the movements of Taiwan’s independence.
Relations between traits have not always been so tense. Only a decade ago, the leaders of the two parties met in Singapore – the first face -to -face meeting since the Chinese civil war. Under my Ying-Jeou (2008-2016), a high level of economic, cultural and political ties has widened. Beijing and Taipei even observed a “diplomatic truce”: the continent has stopped putting pressure on other states to change recognition, and Taiwan has joined several international organizations. To write International securityScott Kastner concluded that the risk of conflict had fallen considerably. These gains were based on the acceptance by MA of the 1992 consensus according to which the two parties belong to “a China”.
The current slowdown and the policy of Taiwan Recalibrée de Washington began after Tsai ING-Wen (2016-2024) and Donald Trump took office. Tsai rejected the 1992 consensus and adopted policies paying the independence of jure. Beijing returned to the more coercive position she had used against the CHEN Shui-Bian administration. In particular, the continent did not do any major exercise in the first two years of Tsai, while waiting to see if it would come back in the One-China framework. Out of ten large -scale exercises held between 2018 and 2024, eight responded directly to American initiatives that have deepened security and political ties with Taiwan.
As indicated above, the recent pekin increase in military activity and diplomatic pressure does not mark a fundamental change towards armed reunification. These movements remain consistent with previous patterns, and some studies even suggest that the continent’s response has not succeeded in the intensity of its previous actions that past episodes. Unlike the dominant Western account that blames the current Crisis of Military Construction of China, the policy of Taiwan de Beijing has remained largely stable.
If the continent had really decided to continue forced reunification, its behavior would contradict the basic strategic logic. An almost sure campaign to trigger American intervention would force the PLA to avoid giving Washington terrains to deepen military ties with Taipei. The exercises around Taiwan were mainly reactive – returned to dissuade the stages of pro independence and American interference – rather than proactive efforts to obtain a decisive advantage. Encouraging closer cooperation in the United States – Taiwan, would actually weaken the relative position of the APL. In addition, a strategy that depends on the surprise would not imply exercises widely published and broadcast live. In short, if Beijing had adopted an offensive reunification strategy since 2016, its observable behavior would be clearly different from what we have seen.
Most of the scholars who examine the Rhetoric and the CPC behavior towards Taiwan find no evidence that Beijing has adopted an “armed reunion” policy or that Taiwan has never been treated as a threat which must be defeated. Alarms concerning an imminent invasion are generally based on ambiguous indicators – such as the unfounded claim of the CIA director according to which force will be used by 2027 – and is mainly focused on potential damage to American strategic interests if Washington “loses” Taiwan. Driven by this Munich-type fear, the United States has moved its own policy: Trump and Biden administrations have refused to criticize the pro-independence of Tsai President while deepening US-Taiwan security ties.
A more immediate concern is the rhetoric of President Lai Ching-Te, which supervises the relationship between features as “authoritarianism against democracy” and, for the first time, officially designates the continent a “foreign hostile force”. This step is unprecedented: this is the first opportunity on which the Republic of China labeled the “foreign” continent, contradicting its own constitution, and the first since democratization in the late 1980s that it qualified the “hostile” continent. Although the civil war was not resolved, the two parties tacitly pursued peaceful commitment for more than three decades. Lai’s departure from this consensus – coupled with interior power games such as eight months’ detention of an opposition leader and mass recall campaigns against opposition legislators – is destabilizing relations between traits and deepening polarization within Taiwan.
The Trump administration still does not have a coherent policy of Taiwan. Nevertheless, he withdrew the information sheets from the State Department The long-term declaration according to which Washington “does not support the independence of Taiwan”, adopted when the United States transferred diplomatic recognition to the RPC. Since the advent of the LAI administration, Taiwan has already played its most precious card – TSMC, the world’s leading manufacturer – by committing to move significant assets and parts of its value chain in the United States. If Lai pursues provocative movements that recall the Trump’s Taiwan’s policy will likely become more and more volatile. If the current Sino-Us commercial talks even give a preliminary agreement, Trump can reduce American commitments to Taiwan; If the negotiations collapse, he should continue to handle the “Taiwan card” to put pressure on Beijing.
For the future, Taiwan’s question is ready to become more dangerous and more unpredictable. Even a reduction in American security commitments would not dissuade the LAI administration from pouring towards the “red line”, a course that would force Beijing to intensify military exercises around the island. Lai’s strategy deliberately exploits Beijing’s established model to react with force to movements towards de jure Independence, thus creating a self-fulfilling story of a “threatening China” which supports its domestic support. Revealing, while depicting Beijing as a penchant on the invasion, he did not look for an economic decoupling: the continent remains the largest trading partner in Taiwan. To restore a measure of stability and prosperity in the relationships between the features, Washington may need to come back to the approach of the Bush era – consulting lai maneuvers and co -management of the problem with Beijing.
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