The re-election of Donald J. Trump demonstrates that history tells its jokes more than once and leaves it to theorists to explain them. Without history, theory finds refuge in the ideal; without theory, history is a series of unrelated events. A theoretician is one who holds out the stick of history; extends history, so to speak, to periods that reveal a lot about society. For a theorist seeking to make sense of the crisis of the liberal order, this period corresponds to the 1930s and 1940s and coincides with the publication of classic realist texts. Can these texts give meaning to our times? No doubt they intended to.
That of Hans Morgenthau Politics among the nations published five editions during his life. In the fifth edition, in 1978, Morgenthau warned America of what history had in store for those who had forgotten – or failed to learn from – the Nazi experience. In an atomized society, insecure about its future and powerless in the face of existential threats, Morgenthau writes, “the United States is likely to increasingly participate in trends in modern culture that have found their most extreme manifestations in Russia Soviet”. and National Socialist Germany” (Morgenthau 1978: 121).
The “trends in modern culture” that Morgenthau referred to represent the challenge posed by liberal modernity after the death of God. The spiritual void left by this experience intensified the individual’s feeling of insecurity and helplessness in the face of a meaningless existence. It was necessary to restore meaning, and indeed it was, to the loyalty of individuals to secular religions. God was killed but mortals needed their temples of worship. A temple built on a demolished church, the nation, in the words of Reinhold Niebuhr, “pretends to be God” (Niebuhr 1932: 225). Fallen from the sky, the individual is seduced by modern nationalism. Modern nationalism offers a promise of infinitude in a reality of finitude. A sanctuary for shaken self-esteem; a promised land for the restoration of pride in group solidarity.
The experience of the 1930s and 1940s taught the classical realists an important lesson: unless the spiritual needs of the individual are met, extreme nationalism will continue to knock at the door, threatening the fragile internationalism of the liberal order . Even the most Marxist of classical realists, Edward Hallet Carr, who naturally emphasized the needs of employment, drew attention to this spiritual dimension in the reconstruction of the post-war order (Karkour 2023 ). “The new faith,” writes Carr in Peace conditions“must solve the problem of unemployment by proposing a moral objective as powerful as religion was in the Middle Ages” (Carr 1943: 120). In short, the challenge for the architects of the postwar order was to meet the psychosocial needs of the individual; restore meaning and social solidarity in a world abandoned by God.
Has the post-war order met the challenge of liberal modernity? The classical realists did not think so. In the 1950s and 1960s, Morgenthau argued that America had become a “waste society,” driven by hedonistic pursuits and concerned only with endless production and consumption. Politics began and ended at the confines of private happiness. History does not speak of optimism about the future of such a society, Morgenthau concludes in The purpose of American policy; for the lack of citizen engagement to deliberate on the meaning of the nation has led to moral disintegration and, in due time, will lead to either fascism or civil war. Political leadership that fails to engage society in its direction leaves a void that will be filled by “someone else, more likely than not a demagogue or demagogic elite responding to popular emotions and prejudices who will create a public opinion in favor of a policy. It is more likely that a certain policy is unhealthy and dangerous” (Morgenthau 1960: 264).
Has Morgenthau’s prophecy come true with the advent of Trump? It is possible to interpret Trump as a realist, as some realists do (e.g. Schweller 2018). I find this interpretation difficult to accept, given that Trump’s policies do not follow the precepts of the balance of power. The withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal is an example where “maximum pressure” was sought despite Iran posing no threat to the US global position (Karkour 2021). This policy also threw Iran into the arms of America’s opponents – Russia and China. Under strictly realistic conditions – a balance of powers – this policy made little sense.
But how can we explain Trumpism as a phenomenon through the prism of classical realism? In my International affairs article, I offered a response. Trumpism, in my interpretation, “fills a spiritual void left by liberal modernity, imparting a sense of warmth to a society frozen by individualism and social atomism” (Karkour 2022, 581). Trump’s appeal to the “forgotten men and women of our country” seeks to offer this sense of warmth (Trump 2017). In group solidarity, these “forgotten men and women” are no longer limited. They found their God – the nation. Trumpism is their path to disalienation; a temple built on the ruins of their demolished church.
To confront a phenomenon such as Trumpism, therefore, requires something more radical than simply “reforming” the status quo or developing an intelligent strategy – such as “offshore balancing” – that would maintain hegemony. American in the Western Hemisphere. The first is defended by liberals (e.g. Ikenberry 2020), the second by neorealists (e.g. Mearsheimer and Walt 2016). The defense of the liberal order, even reformed, paradoxically deepens the crisis of liberalism. The further the liberal order moves away from traditional mores, the deeper the individual’s feeling of existential anxiety and the crisis of liberalism.
At the same time, the defense of the neorealist strategy lends itself, again paradoxically, to idealism. The more the neorealists impose their strategy on American elites, the more they learn that these elites have little interest in listening to what the neorealists have to say. Since the collapse of the USSR, neorealism has become a symbol of protest. From Kosovo to Iraq, from Libya to Iran, neorealists have failed to change the course of their policies toward what they considered rational. Faced with a recalcitrant political reality, neo-realists have become idealists par excellence.
Ultimately, neither piecemeal reform of the liberal order nor elite-level political engagement will allow a country like the United States to regain the meaning and health of its foreign policy. Just like national interest, and logically before it, the meaning of a nation must be negotiated through a process of democratic deliberations (Karkour and Roesch 2024). Only by engaging in these deliberations can the individual feel empowered as a member of a group. In liberal modernity, this empowerment constitutes a necessary bulwark against the usurpation of power by secular religions. The only substitute for God is appearance before the fellow citizens of the Polis. Because the absence of possibilities for political engagement leaves the individual alienated. Demagogues capitalize on this sentiment by offering a false sense of community to promote their private interests and, more often than not, dangerous policies.
It is true that classic realist texts must ultimately be read in their time. But they didn’t just speak for their time. Carr was a historian; his most memorable book, The twenty-year crisiswas a work of theory. By theorizing, classical realists transcended their time. This is why we should read them today. If those who do not read history may repeat its errors, those who do not read theory may inadvertently reinvent it – often with omissions. Examples abound where IR has missed opportunities to learn from its own texts. It is to Morgenthau that Ty Solomon (2012) returned to shed light on the study of emotions in IR. Meanwhile, Sean Molloy (2020) demonstrated the importance of emigrant to the contemporary understanding of reflexivity in IR.
There is debate today about whether and how IR could be a discipline. If it is useful to be a discipline, as some argue (e.g. Corry 2022), it should also be useful to read the texts that are part of our shared heritage as IR scholars. Especially if these texts, as this article argues, can provide insight to help us understand our times. Or, as theorists, to take upon ourselves the task of explaining the repeated jokes of history.
References
Carr, E. H. (1943) Peace conditions. London: Macmillan.
Corry, O. (2022) “What’s the point of being a discipline?” Four disciplinary strategies and the future of international relations Cooperation and conflict 57:3, pages 290-310.
Ikenberry, J. (2020) A Safe World for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of World Order. London: Yale University Press.
Karkour, H. (2021) “Illiberal and irrational? Trump and the challenge of liberal modernity in American foreign policy”, International relations 35:4, pp. 533-50.
Karkour, H. (2022) “Liberal modernity and the classical realist critique of the (current) international order” International affairs 98:2, pp. 569-86.
Karkour, H. (2023) « From THE Twenty years of crisis to the climate crisis: reconsidering Carr’s thoughts on nationalism and global reform » Journal of International Political Theory19:3, pages 317-334.
Karkour, H. and Roesch, F. (2024) “Toward the IR “Fifth Debate”: Racial Justice and the National Interest in Classical Realism”, Review of International Studies26:2, pp.1-20.
Mearsheimer, J. and Walt, S. (2016) “The Case for Offshore Balancing” Foreign Affairs95:4, pages 70-83.
Molloy, S. (2020) “Realism and reflexivity: Morgenthau, academic freedom and dissent”. European Journal of International Relations 26:2, pp. 321-43.
Morgenthau, H. (1960) The purpose of American policy. New York: Alfred Knopf.
Morgenthau, H. (1978) Politics between nations: the struggle for power and peace5th ed. New York: Alfred Knopf.
Niebuhr, R. (1932) Moral man and immoral society. New York: Scribner.
Schweller, R. (2018) “Three cheers for Trump’s foreign policy”, Foreign Affairs97:5, pages 133-143.
Solomon, T. (2012) “Human Nature and the Limits of the Self: Hans Morgenthau on Love and Power” Review of International Studies 14:2, pp. 201-24.
Trump, D. (2017) inauguration speech, Washington DC, January 17, 2017.
Further reading on international electronic relations