Marta Migliorati is a lecturer at the University of Malta. His research and teaching interests cover European integration, executive policy in the EU and other multi-level systems, legislative oversight, EU immigration and asylum policies, and business foreign countries of the EU. In 2025, she will join ETH Zürich to contribute to the FNS-DFG project “IMPLEMENT.EU”. Marta’s recent publications have appeared in leading academic journals including the Journal of European Public Policy, European Union Politics, Regulator and Governance and Comparative Political Studies. His recent publications include “Concepts and measures of bureaucratic constraints in European Union laws, from hand coding to machine learning”, “Differentiated participation, uniform procedures: EU agencies in the direct implementation of policies” and “The new Nordic routes? Explaining the defense policy choices of the Nordic countries following the war in Ukraine.
Where do you see the most exciting research/debates happening in your field?
Methodologically exciting things are happening. Examining large bodies of data becomes easier (and/or faster) with machine learning and AI. For example, some colleagues from the University of Milan and I analyzed thousands of EU legislative acts to detect the tasks delegated to European and national actors as well as the relationships between them. It took a long time to design, train and validate the machine learning model, but it now works very well and we can corroborate our previous research on a much larger scale. Thematically, a lot has changed as well. Geopolitics, on the one hand, has become omnipresent in academic debates, but also the return of protectionism and the crisis of Western democratic systems. All very exciting topics, if only they did not reflect a very difficult landscape of international relations today. Another topic that fascinates me personally, perhaps understandably given current political and technological developments, is technology and how it is used by policymakers as a means of controlling and/or empowering citizens.
How has the way you understand the world changed over time, and what (or who) has caused the most significant changes in your thinking?
I would say that I have become much more pragmatic (or less idealistic?) than before, and more critical of certain political actions and behaviors. When I entered the field of European politics, I was driven by a great passion for the European project, I found it simply wonderful. But when I began to study it in depth, I became aware of the many flaws and contradictions that underlie it. Eventually, I realized that in Western Europe we often grow up with preconceived ideas about which values are “right” and a confidence in the exceptional ability of our institutions to uphold them. Over time, I understood that, borrowing Ian Manners’ terminology, there is no real “normal” in international relations, and that being a norm setter does not necessarily mean that one is ” Good “. The EU has self-promoted itself through a rhetoric of protecting democracy and human rights which is currently fading in the face of its (in)actions (think migration and asylum policy, think conflict underway in the Middle East), and I believe that the EU could end up paying a high price for it, in the medium and long term.
In 2022, Denmark decided by referendum to commit to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). What were the main national factors that allowed this change to win public and political support?
In two articles published in JEPP, I explained how Danish citizens are generally reluctant to the idea of an expansion of EU sovereignty, in contrast to their political elites, who were ready to join the CSDP well before 2022 What has changed at the national level is public opinion – the Ukrainian crisis has been much larger in scale and proximity than any other conflict since Denmark was granted the waiver in 1993. Two years ago, elites saw a window of opportunity and took advantage of the broader geopolitical context and a heightened perception of collective security needs in Europe to put the CSDP under public scrutiny, and this time they won their bet. Unlike 2015, when a similar referendum on justice and home affairs failed, the Ukrainian crisis has truly reshaped public opinion and priorities.
How has the war in Ukraine influenced the EU’s approach to differentiated integration, particularly in areas such as defence, energy security and foreign policy?
Differentiated integration (DI) means many things, but in its most traditional understanding it refers to the non-uniform application of EU law. After Brexit and Denmark’s abandonment of the CSDP opt-out, several testimonies have claimed that this type of ID is in decline, and I agree: there is not much left to differentiate! However, this could change if the EU, in response to the Ukraine conflict, continues to revise its commitment to enlargement to the point where new countries actually join the bloc (see recent developments in Moldova) – as the ID most often occurs when new countries join the bloc. Furthermore, further differentiation in the area of immigration and asylum could be expected, with the Schengen regime being challenged by founding members such as the Netherlands and Germany (although this may have more to do with the Middle East conflict and global migration trends rather than just Ukraine).
When it comes to defense and foreign policy, it is difficult to predict, because the domain remains intergovernmental and therefore, by definition, differentiated: in many initiatives, each state collaborates in the way and to the extent it chooses. Perhaps we will indeed see less differentiation than before if policy begins to truly become more supranational – we never had a Defense Commissioner before the new Commission. It also depends on what happens in Ukraine and within NATO after Trump’s re-election.
In your article you highlight both long-term defense trends and immediate responses to the war in Ukraine. Do you view these changes in Nordic defense policy as reactionary or as a reflection of deeper structural changes?
From my analysis, it appears that the Nordic countries have experienced slow but steady changes since joining the EU, even if these changes have not always been visible in their societies. In Sweden in particular, neutrality is deeply rooted in national identity and its formal disappearance has been a huge adjustment for people. This gradual shift has been driven by evolving security priorities, NATO’s changing role in Western Europe, and external pressures such as Russia’s foreign policy since 2014. Ultimately, informal participation in security initiatives NATO laid the groundwork for joining the alliance. Structurally, the changes might be deeper and broader today, since they have devoted far more resources to NATO’s defense and operations than before – but then again, many European countries that were already part NATO have done the same in recent years to achieve at least the 2% target.
What will be the long-term security implications for the Nordic region following these defense policy changes? Do you foresee any specific challenges or opportunities?
An important implication is the increase in military cooperation and interoperability between the Nordic states – for example, Sweden took on the task of leading the establishment of NATO land forces in Finland to strengthen defenses against Russia. Challenges could include increasing military spending in both states to achieve higher defense capability. Of course, strengthening the military potential in the region could also create new tensions with Russia on the border (and Finland shares a very long border with Russia!). Recently, Finland denounced cyberespionage from Russia and accused the Kremlin of deliberately sending migrants and asylum seekers across the border.
What could the Nordic countries do to effectively dissuade Russia from adopting new expansionist policies?
Frankly, I don’t know what they could do beyond what they already do. NATO membership was already a very strong signal from the two Nordic countries, which is accompanied by other actions, including deeper military cooperation, higher spending, investments in more cybersecurity systems advanced, participation in the EU sanctions regime…
In your work on the European Parliament and free trade agreements, you highlight increasing politicization. What impact do you see on the EU’s global trade relations?
Currently, global trade relations are precarious – from the EU-China clash over electric cars to Mr Trump claiming that ‘tariffs’ is ‘the most beautiful word in the dictionary’, we seem to be entering in an era where the debate between protectionism and free trade is becoming more complex. increasingly polarized. This polarization could impact the EU’s trade relations with key partners, potentially severing ties with export-dependent economies or prompting changes to supply chain strategies in key sectors. On the EU side, it appears that the new Commission’s approach will be more overtly protectionist than it was before, and not everyone supports this approach, starting with big industries like Saab and EU member states like Germany and Hungary.
What is the most important advice you could give to young researchers in international relations?
With the immense amount of data now available for analysis, it is more important than ever to have a comprehensive understanding of the discipline, balancing empirical and theoretical knowledge. I would recommend always “digging” into the empirical data first to get a sense of what’s going on, but not forgetting how theory may (or may not) be useful in explaining what the data suggests. Empirical research needs data and benefits from inductive methods, but it would be problematic to move to a completely data-driven approach and lose touch with the scientific effort to understand the reasons for phenomena.
Collaboration is also essential, especially for young researchers. Academia can be very competitive and research can sometimes feel isolating, but in my experience the best ideas often come from collaborative work. It promotes broader thinking, constructive criticism, and ultimately learning, providing insight into writing, reading, and navigating academic priorities. Ultimately, the academics I collaborate with have become some of my brightest and dearest friends. Publishing independently is satisfying, but co-writing can bring real joy.
Further reading on international electronic relations