Dr Karsten Friis is a research professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. His research area is security and defense policy in Europe, with a focus on NATO, the Nordic region, the Arctic and transatlantic relations. He is a political scientist with a doctorate from the University of Groningen, Cand.polit. from the University of Oslo and a master’s degree from the London School of Economics. Friis has been associated with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) since 2007. Prior to that, he was a political advisor to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) mission to Serbia (2004 to 2007) , the OSCE in Montenegro (2001) and Kosovo (1999). Additionally, Friis worked for several years in the Norwegian Armed Forces and served with NATO/Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo. He also frequently comments on public discourse, particularly regarding Russia’s war against Ukraine. His latest publications include: “The defense of Northern Europe: new opportunities, significant challenges”, “Relaunching Nordic cooperation in security and defense‘, ‘Even if the war continues, NATO should open the door to defense integration with Ukraine‘ And ‘Rethinking Territory: How Ukraine Can Redefine Victory‘.
Where do you see the most exciting research/debates happening in your field?
Debates linked to dramatic changes in the world, in terms of security and transfers of power, that is to say the empirical debates, are by far the most interesting. Theoretical debates struggle to keep pace, which is not strange given the dynamics of the world. So, issues related to global governance, new alternative structures (from the “ghost fleet” to BRICS), war and security (DPRK soldiers in Europe), new threats and technologies – all these Topics challenge our traditional perspectives on world politics.
How has the way you understand the world changed over time, and what (or who) has caused the most significant changes in your thinking?
When the world changes, so does our attention. I worked for many years on international operations, COIN, global approach, peacekeeping, etc., but when a large-scale war broke out in Europe, my focus also changed. Nobody talks about R2P anymore, but in reality Russian aggression is also an attack on the liberal values that R2P represents, namely universal human rights. The defense of Ukraine is the defense of the freedom of the people to choose their path, their foreign policy and their international orientation.
How important is the Nordic Defense Cooperation’s recent commitment to a concept of common security, and what impact might this have on NATO’s strategy in Northern Europe?
The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO has opened up many new opportunities for defense cooperation between the Nordic countries. Air and land forces are in daily contact to develop closer integration. But all of this takes place under the umbrella of NATO, within NATO plans, force structure, command and control. There is no independent Nordic strategy or concept, but rather attempts to link regional forces into a unified force within NATO. That said, new initiatives, such as a combined air operations center, a new multi-corps Army headquarters, and other new structures, clearly signal a renewed interest in defense collaboration.
The accession of Sweden and Finland significantly strengthens NATO and improves the defense of northern Norway, but of course also of Sweden and Finland (that is after all why they joined) . NATO has a plan for the northwest, one of three NATO strategic defense plans. This requires new thinking, particularly in terms of logistics and supply to these countries, via Norway and the Baltic Sea. NATO must plan all this.
To what extent is Norwegian defense policy influenced by Norwegian identity and values?
I think that the defense policy of each state is influenced by its identity and values – including Norway. In our case, it is based partly on the painful experience of occupation during the Second World War (we are therefore a founding member of NATO), but also on a country with a small identity of State, which means a history of building bridges, dialogue and trade. rather than conquest and power play. Norwegian deterrence against the Soviet Union and now Russia is, for example, moderate, with a reduced military presence near Russia to avoid “provocations” or an increase in tensions. This is directly linked to our identity and the narrative of “1000 years of peaceful relations” with Russia. This axiom can be deconstructed and questioned, but it nevertheless continues to play a role in Norwegian security policy circles.
What improvements could strengthen integration in the Nordic defense domain? What key changes would be needed to make this possible?
The integration of Nordic defense is a function of NATO membership. Depending on the details of NATO’s defense plans, command structure and force structure, opportunities for closer Nordic cooperation and integration arise. When, for example, Finland establishes a forward land force unit on its territory, with Sweden as the leading umbrella nation, others, notably Denmark and Norway, could also contribute. Likewise, when NATO agrees to establish a Combined Air Operations Center in Norway, it provides the opportunity for air forces to work together even more closely. Some of these initiatives come from the branches themselves, others are the result of processes within NATO or at the political-strategic level.
I think we will end up with a de facto single air force, although still under national or NATO control. On land, the forces will be national, but the area of responsibility (AOR) may cross national borders, and all will be under the direction of a joint division and corps headquarters. However, it is important not only to think Nordic, but also to integrate with the larger powers engaged in the region, notably the United States and the United Kingdom. All of the structures mentioned – as well as other initiatives – should involve important allies.
Do you think the Nordic response to the war in Ukraine was sufficient?
The Nordic and Baltic countries have provided significant support to Ukraine. But I fear more is needed, especially in the short term. I think 2025 will be a decisive year, and Ukraine can win if we strengthen its defense – not reduce it, as we (the West) did between 2023 and 2024. In particular, my own country , with its huge oil revenues, could invest much more in Ukraine than today. Among the Nordic countries, we give the least, both in real numbers and as a percentage of GDP. It is really urgent that the government invests, particularly in the Ukrainian defense industry. Success there will be decisive.
How do you assess the Nordic countries’ relations with major powers like the United States, Russia and China?
All Nordic countries have strong bilateral agreements with the United States in addition to NATO. This is crucial because no other ally has the resources to assist in the event of a major conflict. They will seek to maintain them, regardless of who sits in the White House. Russia is a country with which no Nordic state can maintain meaningful dialogue. It will remain this way as long as Putin is in power. China is a little more mixed. The Nordic countries are following EU and NATO language towards China and trying to reduce risks, but not decouple. Exchanges on non-securitized items will continue. But Sweden, for example, has significant Chinese investments (like Volvo) which cannot be gotten rid of in one fell swoop.
What is the most important advice you could give to young researchers in international relations?
Read the classics! Not just in IR, but also in sociology. Also read Theory and Philosophy of Science. But stay relevant to the world around you. Nobody cares about the introverted, quasi-philosophical debates about IR theory. Use theories and classics as you see fit to better analyze empirical phenomena. But don’t overcomplicate it. Have fun!
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