The war in Ukraine profoundly affects the future of Germany and Europe. But one thing is certain: there will be a tomorrow. Since war tends to escalate to extremes, it must be politically contained with the aim of ending it as soon as possible and preventing it in the future. This is particularly relevant when, as in the case of the war in Ukraine, nuclear powers are directly and indirectly involved. Therefore, after three years of fierce fighting, it makes sense to speculate about the possible outcomes and risks of the war, as well as its consequences for Germany and Europe. I assume three possible scenarios: 1. Russia wins the war. 2. Ukraine wins the war. 3. No one wins and the conflict remains in an unstable stalemate. The first scenario is unlikely but carries a high risk for Germany and Europe. The second scenario is less unlikely but is also associated with high risk due to the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons. The third scenario is more likely and presents a comparatively lower, but nonetheless reasonable, risk. Taking each of these scenarios into account, we can reach the following conclusions:
First, Germany has – in addition to its confusing approach practiced so far – various security policy options depending on the outcome of the war in Ukraine: 1. The completion of a European union fully integrated defense, economic and financial systems. 2. The assumption of a quasi-hegemonic leadership role as America’s main continental weapon in Europe. 3. The hypothesis of a strong nationalist role in Europe. 4. The formation of a European group within NATO and close cooperation on security policy between NATO and the EU. It would not take a war in Ukraine to implement these options in one form or another. However, until now, the political will and corresponding framework conditions have been lacking. The war in Ukraine and its aftermath could produce both. However, facing the early elections of February 23, 2025, most of the political parties concerned are not clearly advocating for one of these options. They always prefer a confusing approach. The only exception is the right-wing AFD (Alternative for Germany), which wants to leave NATO and the EU as well as end sanctions against Russia. While the AFD is clearly campaigning for the third option, the Social Democrats lean more towards the fourth, the Greens for the first and the Christian Democrats for the second.
Second, the outcome of the war in Ukraine will have a decisive impact on German and European security. The possibility of a Russian victory would pose high risks for the security of Germany and Europe and would have considerable negative consequences for Ukraine and the stability of the continent. It should therefore absolutely be avoided. A Ukrainian victory may be desirable, but it is associated with a high risk of nuclear escalation, which could lead to the destruction of Ukraine and even Europe. A stalemate would likely result in a new “cold war,” which, at best, could evolve into a “cold peace” in the form of nonviolent competition between systems. At worst, it would mean permanent tensions and the threat of war in the sense of a constant struggle for good order.
Third, there are three common truths in European security: the first is that Russia remains a relevant Eastern European neighbor for Germany and the EU in terms of geography and potential. The other common truth is that the United States will remain an indispensable player in European security for the foreseeable future, including during Donald Trump’s second term. Germany and Europe therefore have an interest in the United States getting involved appropriately in Europe and for Europe. The third common truth is that China plays an important role in this conflict. In the event of a Russian victory, China could feel emboldened to use force to achieve its goals regarding Taiwan. A Russian defeat would undermine Chinese ambitions and allow the United States to focus on Beijing. This is why China has no interest in seeing a defeated Russia. A stalemate in the war in Ukraine, leading to a stable armistice, would tie the United States to Europe and allow Beijing to play the role of mediator, whose influence in Europe and Russia would increase.
Fourth, whatever the scenario, Berlin will have to spend more on its own defense and that of the EU. The more American involvement in Europe diminishes, the heavier the German and European defense burden will be. In the current election campaign, the political center parties are competing with firm announcements on an increase in defense spending ranging from “more than 2 percent” of GDP (Christian Democrats, Social Democrats) to 3 percent ( Christian Social Union) and 3.5 percent (Greens). . Furthermore, Germany’s share of the costs of supporting Ukraine will likely increase, even though it is already the largest European supporter in terms of total bilateral allocations. At the same time, Berlin must advance the European integration project and contribute to the economic and political stabilization of Eastern Europe. This is expected to lead to increased national budgetary conflicts and social tensions in Germany, which could favor extremist parties. In order to minimize such conflicts, possibilities for peaceful coexistence with an imperialist Russia must be explored.
Given that a victorious peace is unlikely for any of the protagonists and that the costs of war are constantly increasing, not only for the direct opponents of the war, but also for their supporters and the non-negligible number of states that remain apart, Berlin should strive to achieve a victorious peace. a regulation consistent with the third scenario. This combines a territorial compromise acceptable to both opponents with maintaining Ukraine’s legal position and postponing a final settlement until the future. While being strong supporters of a victory for Ukraine, the parties in the political center have begun to become aware of the new realities, but have not yet drawn their respective conclusions. The far left and far right parties are already pleading in favor of the third scenario, but they have a negative conception of the two pillars of European stability, NATO and the EU, and a naive vision of Russia as an aggressor.
Germany must be aware that the bon mot attributed to NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Hastings Ismay, still applies in modified form: NATO is there to keep the Russians out, the Americans in. the interior and the Germans involved (instead of “putting them down”). , as in the original quote). It is still in Germany’s interest to work to restore the 1967 Harmel Formula, according to which sufficient defense capacity and détente can enable security between system adversaries. After all, Russia will not disappear from the scene and will one day become interested in cooperation again. Finally, Berlin must be careful not to evolve into a long-term hegemonic role, as this could lead to conflicts and the formation of counter-alliances. This means remaining committed to the European project and investing more than ever in European integration.
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