“Who guards the guards?” In other words, if the military exists to protect the state, who guarantees and supervises its obedience? This nearly two millennia old issue has preoccupied policymakers throughout history because the consequences of failing to resolve it can be disastrous. Without effective control, the military can exploit its material power to undermine or overthrow civilian authority, whether through coups or other methods of intervention. The crux of the dilemma lies in the intrinsic tension between civilian politics and militarist security: the former derives its authority from legitimacy, while the latter exercises material power. To prevent this dilemma from undermining governance, it is imperative that the military consistently adheres to the authority of civilian leaders in all circumstances. Therefore, making the military apolitical becomes the heart of the problem.
Nonetheless, across the world, many nations have been overthrown by their own guardians in the worst possible scenario. Even when the guards choose not to revolt, the problem persists. The military may choose to intentionally evade the policies adopted by the civilian government or politicize itself to take advantage of its preferences. As a result, overall defense capacity and readiness may be hampered by a less professional military corps, leading to the erosion of national security. For this reason, how to rein in the military, especially the top brass, has been the focus of discussions on civil-military relations. As the principle of civilian supremacy, based on organic law, becomes widely accepted, the likelihood that the military will disobey civilian authority diminishes. Therefore, (liberal) democracy, anchored in the rule of law, has been seen as the key to solving this conundrum. Theoretically, this provides the basis for a political system of checks and balances and a more stable societal structure upon which strong civilian control over the military can be achieved.
In mature democracies, most, if not all, civilian governments and politicians no longer fear outright subversion or revolt by the military. However, society must remain vigilant against the erosion of the rule of law and democracy. Equally important is the expectation within the military, from the top brass down, that respect for democratic norms will prevail. Over time, as democratization advances, military personnel are likely to adopt civilian supremacy as a common-sense measure.
However, recent cases have revealed that the story is not over. In 2023, the U.S. federal government was inches away from shutting down the government, primarily due to serious political differences. Like other public sector employees and personnel, the United States military depends on the budget and programs of the federal government. Although a shutdown was narrowly averted, military personnel’s confidence in the political system remains far from assured. Political impasses, such as federal government shutdowns and delays in funding and investment in defense projects, pose challenges to the stability of civil-military relations.
A more worrying problem is the growing entanglement of politics with defense and security issues. As noted previously, “protecting the guardians” is fundamentally linked to the depoliticization of the military. The military must remain separate from national – and often international – political affairs and focus solely on defense and security. This principle is illustrated by the professionalization of the army, which helps to discourage incentives for politicization. The problem is that it could be the civilian side that politicizes the military, or it could cause the military to politicize itself. The ability of liberal democracy and its norms to prevent this in advance is deeply questionable. This is not to say that liberal democracy is inherently “doomed,” but rather that fair and transparent elections, as well as guaranteed individual rights, play a limited role in preventing such situations.
Although few people would expect this to happen in mature democracies, it has already happened in recent times, and it may only be a matter of time for others, while South Korea faced a failed self-coup attempt by embattled President Yoon. December 3, 2024. President Yoon emphasized the “alliance of values” between liberal democratic countries and the fight against dictatorship around the world, especially in the upper half of the Korean Peninsula. But it was he who put South Korean democracy and its resilience to the ultimate test by declaring brutal and legally inadequate martial law and sending elite army units to the National Assembly and election commission national. Although martial law was lifted by the resolution passed in the National Assembly, the political crisis is worsening even more in the country as we write these lines.
In the United States, President Donald J. Trump has already demonstrated his intention to oust the “liberal/leftist” faction among the military’s top brass by creating a “warrior council.” His main argument is that the military needs to be cleansed of radical liberals and so-called “woke generals” who have imposed a “diversity, equity and inclusion” agenda on the military for many years. .
Another example is Israel. Last year, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanayhu and his coalition carried out controversial judicial reforms. The IDF Reserve Forces (Israel Defense Forces), particularly the Air Force and cyber and technology units, participated in the protest against the government’s judicial reform plan, refusing to attend the exercises training or to report for reserve service. Although this case is unlike that of the United States, in which politics directly politicized the military, Israel’s 2023 judicial reform plan clearly intensified the incentive for politicization for part of the IDF.
There are many cases if the scope of what constitutes a democracy expands. Hungary, Poland, India, Brazil and many other countries, described as hybrid or illiberal democracies, are already in play, raising concerns about the politicization of the military by the ruling coalition and its powerful leaders . In return, the politicized army would strengthen the power of the civilian forces in power. This means that stable, healthy and depoliticized civil-military relations can only be achieved when both actors (the civilian government and the military), not just one, do not politicize the military. It is therefore of the utmost importance to answer the following question: under what conditions can the incentive to politicize the army be controlled, both for the civilian government and for the army?
The “second image” in civil-military relations offers a potential answer. In the field of international relations (IR), the three images sequentially represent the individual actor, the national political system, and the international system/structure. Accordingly, the second picture in the context of civil-military relations encompasses factors such as political system or structure, political situation and political context or orientation.
These factors all directly constitute and contribute to the incentive to politicize (by) the military, while other images are either exogenous or endogenous to it, affecting in complementary ways. Although the cases mentioned above include the strong leader factor, a strong leader at the individual level does not automatically increase incentives for politicization. Furthermore, the political party and movement in question largely constitutes a body politic, larger than a single individual actor. Most important is the national political context in which a strong leader emerges and exercises power.
The national political system includes elements such as national-level democracy, a federal system, and presidentialism. The underlying structural elements that define the fundamental conditions and boundaries of the game include the total number of games and participants as well as the set of rules. The national political system plays a crucial role in defining the essential parameters and restrictions that govern the nature and extent of incentives to politicize (by) the military. Poor quality democracy can quickly lead to strong incentives for politicization, potentially escalating into a full-blown military coup.
Factors that influence the political situation include the number of major political parties, the presence of a unified or divided government, the extent of political polarization, public opinion on the popularity of the government, and the importance of election years. The specific payoff structure of the game is determined by these situational factors. Civil-military relations and related issues are influenced by the political circumstances of the moment. For example, divided government and increased political polarization in South Korea have likely increased the chances that President Yoon will impose martial law to try to break a current political impasse.
Participants’ attitudes toward a specific issue relating to civil-military relations are shaped by their political orientation and the context in which they operate, resulting in a particular nuance. The first means a mix of populist, radical and revolutionary ideologies that currently dominate politics; the latter includes a specific historical trajectory, such as anticommunism, which shapes the global perspective and influences institutions and the legal system. When a dominant political group, influenced by its national societal or political context, exemplifies a dominant political orientation, the severity of the issue in question increases, thereby accelerating the issue of civil-military relations. This is well reflected in the cases of anti-communist appeal in the South Korean case, and in the context of national (ethnic) survival and right-wing populism in the Israeli case.
To conclude by considering the brief analysis of the second image of civil-military relations, the persistent question around the link between the civil and military spheres can be reformulated as follows: “how to protect the guardians and the masters?
Further reading on international electronic relations