Opinion – Post-Assad Syrian comedy Trendy Blogger

Comedy is the art of telling the truth without reaching the threshold of offense. It is precisely in testing what this threshold is at a given moment that the usefulness of comedians for societies lies, in particular those living under an authoritarian regime (Billig 2005). This is exactly what the Syrian comedy did under the two regimes of Assad, father and son. For years, comedy productions showed Syrians what they already knew; the absurd realities of daily life that they have grown accustomed to ignoring. By dramatizing the known, humor allows people to re-evaluate their realities by detaching them from their own lived experiences.

However, viewing comedy as solely a tool for political protest is overly simplistic and, for lack of a better term, clear-cut. In Assad’s Syria, comedy was both a vehicle for unwanted criticism and a stabilizing force that further perpetuated the regime’s ideology (Wedeen 2013). Inhabiting both poles, the comic subgenre of Syrian drama constituted an entire sphere in which the dramatized reflection of an underground, cautious, and intellectual public sphere was strangely hyper-visible.

Over the years, Syrian theater has produced thousands of comedic productions that directly address the dark realities of life in Syria. Through sketches of notable series such as Passage (Mirrors), viewers would be exposed to a dramatized version that would remind them of the limits of their own citizenship. In this, Syrian comedy was clearly an institution of discipline. More remarkable, however, has been the role of Syrian comedy in revealing the complicity of ordinary citizens themselves in co-producing the absurdities of Syrian life. This reduces the effectiveness of comedy as a tool of political protest against the regime and doubles it, on the contrary, as collective confessions of citizens themselves for their role in the future of Syria.

Having operated under both Assad regimes, the Syrian media industry has demonstrated an impressive understanding of the political context in which it has still managed to produce art. Although for many, Hafiz Al Assad and Bashar Al Assad were unbroken continuations of the same regime, the two regimes, although non-binary, were markedly different in the type of lived experiences they created for the ordinary Syrian. For example, Hafiz’s regime was much clearer than his son in communicating its limitations on citizenship (Wedeen 2013). Through the disciplinary capacity of his personality cult, he would draw a thick line between what was acceptable and what was not (Wedeen 2013).

Meanwhile, Bashar initially displayed a gentler, kinder image, one that sold aspirational freedom as part of his new ideology of the good life (Wedeen 2013). This ideology of good living was a grouping of the most liberal and autocratic policies, which earned Syria the label of neoliberal autocracy (Wedeen 2013). The problem with this amalgamation of neoliberalism and authoritarianism was that it produced a gray model that challenged Hafiz’s black-and-white political imagination of Syria. Bashar had removed the line left by Hafiz. This created a real problem for the media industry, which not only did not know where the limits were, but also did not have the political vocabulary capable of grasping the new Syria, paradoxical and liberal and coercive. If comedy symbolizes forbidden knowledge as the robust humor literature suggests, then the status of Syrian comedy demonstrates that forbidden knowledge was much more accessible in Hafiz’s Syria than in Bashar’s.

Under Hafiz, comedians needed little guesswork to know where the red lines actually were. For example, the use of regional dialects such as Druze or Alawite dialects was not to be used in television productions and would be limited to theater only (Dick 2007). Meanwhile, under Bashar, soap operas like Highlight (Boqa’a Daou) And Forgotten Village (Daya Daya) the overall lines of force were often based on the expert use of these dialects, which were understood as direct references to the Alawite core of the regime (Dick 2007). An overwhelming majority of the characters ridiculed in the series were also based in a non-urban setting, and sometimes in Latakia itself – the home state of the Assads themselves – further reinforcing the reference to the regime’s base (Dick 2007). .

Furthermore, under Hafiz, the majority of sketches were limited to directing political criticism to the middle ranks of the regime, without ever directly addressing the pillars of power (Dick 2007). Under Bashar, however, the rank of general manager (mode ‘aam) was eventually crossed over to include members of the security and military complex, the intelligence apparatus, ministers and, ironically, the political censors themselves. This shattering of the old ceiling is a direct result of Bashar’s new rhetoric about a new Syria, in which freedom can be aspired to by those who behave as “good citizens.” Soon, interpretive comedy about what it means to be a good citizen became a throughline of Syrian sketches that almost emphasized the social construction of a corrupt Syria.

The emphasis on everyone’s role in co-managing Syrian life has inadvertently humanized everyone. Through comic dramatization, he articulated an argument for all political existence in Syria. This included the corruption of the corrupt, the dissent of the dissidents, and the actions of the perpetrators. Certainly, a remarkable achievement. However, in doing so, it also created a negative appraisal of the services rendered by the regime in limiting the power of its morally deprived fellow citizens, reinforcing the uncertainties of liberty that might arise from sharing a liberty with citizens as lacking in liberty . kindness”, as their fellow citizens are presented as being.

From 2011 to 2024, the price of political humor increased, pushing it in many cases (but not all) towards underground productions (Noderer 2020). The pro-revolution comedians demonstrated political humor by symbolically dethroning their leader (Noderer 2020). They did this by crossing the line and directly insulting the personality of the leader, including his physical characteristics (Noderer 2020). Scripts were no longer hidden, multi-layered, or open to interpretation. Meanwhile, during this same period, Syrian media continued to interact with the censors by airing sketches that were still critical of everyone during the war.

For many, a government’s level of tolerance towards its actors is an indicator of its health. The Assad years have produced rich content that provides in-depth insight into the health of both Syrias. It remains to be seen how the new Syrian government, during its transition and consolidation, will react to political humor? Will the Syrian opposition, which has produced jokes for many years, now accept being ridiculed? Will civil society continue to accept its role as accomplice in Syria’s future? Whatever the answers, it’s worth celebrating the end of an era for remarkable Syrian comedy produced in a context of unfreedom.

References

Cheap, Michael. 2005. Laughter and ridicule: towards a social critique of humor.