Donald Trump repair of the maximum pressure on Iran, February 4th 2025, and his alleged Ultimatum letter to the Iranian government, sparked concerns about the increase in tensions of the Middle East. However, the United States is faced with an Iran which has past experience of the first Trump administration and can therefore anticipate Trump’s policies. Iran’s offense strategy first involves establishing a ring of friendly relations with neighboring states in the Middle East. Second, strategic signaling and preparation for cooperation with the West. Third, deepen relations with Russia and China, coverage if the two previous strategies fail. As part of the “first policy of neighbors”, Iran has established friendly relations with neighboring Gulf states, to blunt America’s ability to strike Iran. After all, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (water) helped support the maximum pressure imposed by Trump and its 1,500 sanctions against Iran in 2018.
Since 2024, Iran has been on a diplomatic offensive. After the restoration of diplomatic relations in 2023 in 2023 with Saudi Arabia, negotiated by China, Iran’s Saudi relations warmed at unprecedented levels. In October 2024, Saudi Arabia and Iran remarkably held joint military exercises, while the Head of the Saudi army went to Tehran in November 2024 to discuss bilateral defense cooperation. Bilateral meetings with water took place with Iranian ministers, who met the President of Water and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In February 2025, for the first time, four ships of the Iranian navy accosted in Sharjah for a three -day visit to discuss maritime security. Iran has also standardized links with Bahrain, who sent a message via Russia to Tehran to resume diplomatic relations. In October 2024, the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs visited Bahrain for the first time in seventeen years.
Friendly relations with neighboring gulf states serve two strategic objectives. First, reducing the perceptions of Iran’s threats, blurring the ability of the Trump administration to secure Iran as the most urgent existential threat. Consequently, these Gulf States may not want to apply conflicting American policies, making traditional American strategies against Iran as less effective diplomatic isolation. Iran’s diplomatic strategy recalls the “Defense before” strategy that uses Iran-supported proxy militias to create a stamp, pushing conflicts with the United States and Israel beyond Iranian territory.
Although the Trump administration can force Gulf States to apply confrontation policies, taking advantage of the American military presence which benefits the security of the Gulf States. It can be argued that the fear of renewing regional instability and war by tensions relaunched with Iran prevails over the pressure of the Trump administration. In addition, friendly relations and open dialogue with Tehran make Iran less an immediate threat.
Secondly, the Gulf States could intercede for Tehran, to moderate American confrontation policies and even mediate American-Iranian tensions. After all friendly relations with Iran and the desire to preserve regional stability offer strong incentives in the Gulf to mediate American-Iranian relations. It is not incidental that targets for Iranian diplomatic awareness, Saudi Arabia and water are American security partners and whose leaders have close relations with President Trump. Saudi Arabia recently indicated the opening to the mediation of American-Iranian tensions, by making a new nuclear agreement.
Mutual alignment of interests makes the Gulf unusually receptive to Iranian diplomatic openings. The two recognize the danger of a destabilizing regional war, which neither the Gulf nor Iran can afford. In particular, Saudi Arabia undergoes an economic transformation, within the framework of the Vision 2030 plan, diversifying far from oil with ambitious urban development projects such as Neom. International sanctions have paralyzed the economy of Iran, with high inflation almost 40% and a devalued currency. However, despite the interests aligned, close economic investments and partnerships with Iran represent a red line in the Gulf-Iran relations. Gulf states have hesitated to increase economic ties with Iran, which would violate the sanctions imposed by the United States and cause American reprisals.
Iran has also reported openness to dialogue and cooperation with the West, despite the anti-Western position of Tehran. This strategy signals pragmatism, giving no excuse to the West to target Iran, and allows Tehran to find arranged Western partners who could either intercede in the name of Iran, or a moderate Western aggression. Thus, while direct official negotiations with the United States may seem unlikely, Tehran hopes to fragment the United West opposition by engaging with more open and neutral parties.
Even before the election and renewal of Trump’s maximum pressure, Iran’s political establishment reported the opening of Western dialogue. The adviser of the supreme chief of Iran, Ali Akbar Velayati, said in an interview that Iran is “open to narrower Western ties”. President Masoud Pezeshkian announced to the UN that Iran was “ready to engage” the West on its nuclear program. The Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi proclaimed the opening of Iran to “constructive negotiations” with the Western states arranged.
This explains why direct negotiations took place on the Iranian nuclear program with Germany, France and the United Kingdom on January 13th 2025. In 2024, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had access to the inspection of Iranian uranium enrichment facilities. Iran would have enabled the IAEA to increase its inspection visits, to revive international concerns concerning high levels of uranium enrichment and to demonstrate the transparency of the international regime.
Iranian economic and security relations improved with Russia and China are the third strategy resisting Trump and represents coverage against the other two strategies. Russia and China represent key partners in Iran, collectively facing American sanctions and American attempts to limit their influence. Consequently, this “upheaval axis” endeavored to create independent economic and military ties to American pressure.
In recent years, Iran has been dedicated more and more to Russia and China to survive the economic and diplomatic isolation imposed by the United States. China and Russia have already signed complete strategic partnerships with Iran describing improved economic, security and policies.
In 2023, Russia was the largest foreign investor in Iran, investing 2.7 billion US dollars. In 2024, Russia and Iran created the Shetab-Mir system, integrating Iranian and Russian banking systems, allowing Iran to bypass international sanctions and encourage trade in Iranian rials and Russian rubles. China welcomed Iran as a full-fledged member of the Shanghai Cooperation Council and encouraged Iran’s inclusion in the BRICS, while Iranian Chinese Chinese Oil Purchases and have reported the smuggling of sanctioned technologies, stress the importance of Iran-China relations.
Indeed, Iranian relations with Russia and China are faulty security, offering Iran a financial rescue buoy and preventing full international isolation. Tehran recognizes that his diplomatic efforts to the Gulf and the West could be compromised by an international alarm on its accelerated nuclear program.
Although it remains to be seen if these strategies will fully isolate Iran from the second maximum pressure of President Trump. Tehran’s objective is to survive the second Trump administration by maintaining a regional influence and predicting international isolation. This has become more and more essential to Iranian stability, given the weakened state of the Iranian resistance axis, which suffered from the collapse of the Syrian Assad regime, and from the besieged circumstances of Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. In case of success, these strategies could also point out a broader change in the Iranian strategic calculation to more diplomacy. Optimically, Iran’s international influence will greatly benefit from this if it succeeds in training alliances with regional rivals, restoring dialogue with Europe while maintaining links with Russia and China. Consequently, the reduction in the need to support clandestine militias to preserve the international influence of Iran.
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