In January, President Trump qualified North Korea as “Nuclear publication”With the nomine of the Secretary of State then Pete Hegseth Indicating the same thing, arousing concerns of South Korea. These statements suggest a future in which, rather than promoting denuclearization, the United States recognizes the nuclear program of North Korea and are rather focusing on the limitation of the production of additional weapons. Such a policy can comply with the own objectives of North Korea, because the country in January has described as a “Responsible nuclear state” At a conference on the disarmament of the United Nations. We then ask: how does the American public consult the nuclear weapons of North Korea?
North Korea began its pursuit of nuclear weapons in the 1960s when they coordinated with the Soviet Union on the development of missile technology. However, the demand for Kim Il Sung of nuclear weapons was only responded with assistance in nuclear energy technology. North Korea continued to continue nuclear weapons despite the initial ratification of the non-proliferation treaty (TNP) in 1985 and to sign the joint declaration concerning a non-nuclear Korean peninsula in 1992, in the end, while the NPT in 2002. In 2006, North Korea carried out its first nuclear test, while under Kim Jong (2011-).
North Korea is supposed to have around 50 nuclear warheadsAlthough some estimates put it Closer to 90And the capacities to double this amount according to the fissile materials available. Even and more longer-term missile tests now suggest the ability to hit almost everywhere in the United States, although this does not ensure the second strike capabilities of North Korea. Likewise, the success of the same a hit nuclear weapon South Korea would be devastating. In 2022, the Assembly of the Supreme People (SPA) adopted a law that widens the scope in which North Korea can use their nuclear weapons and, in 2023, added a language to their constitution on their nuclear weapons. Kim Jong One also declared that he is devoting himself to varying their nuclear stock and broadening “exponential” production.
Most experts suggest that the regime considers these weapons in terms of improving defensive capacities, dissuading potential invasions without the need to match traditional military capacities. However, if the regime considers their options to be more and more limited, diplomacy can lose against a greater desire to consider offender. Kim Jong a jong a He himself said that weapons were not only for defensive measures. Others argue that nuclear capacities themselves are not the problem, but how a nuclear from North Korea to modify Traditional alliances.
Understanding American public opinion here is crucial for several reasons. An audience particularly concerned about nuclear weapons of North Korea can lead political decision -makers to adopt a more aggressive position towards the country, that this can worsen the problem. The way the public considers this threat also has ramifications for the American alliance of South Korea, and in particular the continuation of the American bases in the country. Meanwhile, an audience that considers the North Korea program to be mainly defensive, it is unlikely that it requires denuclearization, opening the door potentially for a change to the limitation of the number of nuclear weapons.
Survey data systematically show Americans consider North Korea as a Critical challengeAlthough direct questions about their nuclear program are less common. More than three -quarters Gallup respondents from 2003 to 2019 unfavorablely the country. A Yougov Survey 2016 found that 14% of respondents considered North Korea as an immediate and serious threat to the United States, an additional 42% calling a somewhat serious threat. Only 7% considered that the country was not a threat. The investigations of Pew Research Center in 2013 and 2017 find an American audience which is growing more and more North Korea capable and arranged To use nuclear weapons against the United States, 65% of respondents in 2017 said they were very concerned about the fact that North Korea had nuclear weapons. However, according to Gallup data from 2001 to 2019, North Korea has only been considered the greatest threat to the United States Only one year: 2018. Survey data from 2020 to 2024 also show Few Americans The feeling of North Korea should be able to maintain its nuclear weapons, with rates similar in Pakistan, and well below views of the same weapons from China and Russia.
To combat this public feeling, we have ordered an investigation into the web by the penny from February 12 to 26. We asked 522 respondents two interdependent questions: (1) In your opinion, does North Korea have the right to nuclear weapons? And (2) Do you think, North Korea keeps nuclear weapons for offensive or defensive purposes? (See Figures 1 and 2). The first would aim to determine whether the respondents consider North Korea as having the right that any sovereign state should choose a nuclear arsenal or if, because of beliefs on weapons in general or in North Korea, in particular, that they should be excluded from the category of recognized nuclear states. The second exploits how nuclear weapons in North Korea are assessed.
We note that almost three -quarters (73.18%) of the state of North Korea have no arms law, with a marginal difference between the Democrats (73.89%) and the Republicans (71.36%). Likewise, almost two thirds indicate that the country’s weapons are for offensive purposes (65.52%), without substantial difference on partisan lines. In addition, the views are strongly correlated: those who believe that North Korea is entitled to these weapons is slightly more likely to consider weapons as a defensive nature (50.71%), while those who deny North Korea this right consider weapons as offensive (71.47%).
We assume that opinions would also be shaped not only but preexisting beliefs on North Korea, but also the way in which the country can be felt. Earlier in the survey, we asked respondents to assess North Korea, among several countries, on a scale of five points (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive). We note that the preexisting views are not surprisingly shape the views with those who have negative views of the country (1-2), which included three-quarters of the respondents, declaring that the country had no good nuclear weapons (79.03%), while 67.92% of those who have a positive vision of the country (3-4) declaring that they had a right to arms.
Likewise, those who already consider the country to negatively considered their weapons as an offensive nature (70.08%), against only 39.62% of respondents with a positive opinion. We measured how we thought we thought they were on North Korea on a four -point scale (not informed at all very informed). Here, only 21.26% of low -informed respondents thought that North Korea was entitled to nuclear weapons, going to 37.93% among the most enlightened. However, in the two groups, only 34.48% thought that the nuclear program was for defensive purposes.
Our results indicate an American audience which largely rejects the law of North Korea to nuclear weapons and perceives its program as of offensive nature. The results may indicate an audience that no longer considers the nuclear use standard as absolute or poorly understood the strategic calculations of North Korea nuclear policy. While the expert consensus argues that North Korea stocks are fundamentally a question of deterrence, the public perception of an offensive posture could shape political debates in a way that encourages more confrontation strategies rather than diplomatic engagement.
In addition, the strong opposition to the recognition of North Korea as a nuclear state, including those that felt more informed, suggest that American views are deeply rooted and that this rigidity can limit the flexibility of a Trump administration in the continuation of the control measures to the short -run weapons of complete denuclearization, despite increasing recognition that North Korea is unlikely to refuse these weapons. If North Korea proceeds to another nuclear test, public concerns can intensify more, preventing pragmatic commitment.
Figure 1
Figure 2
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