On December 8, 2024, the streets of Damascus broke out in a mixture of jubilation and uncertainty while Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist Sunni militia with roots like an al-Qaeda emanation, a regime of Bashar al-Assad after an 11-day offensive. Overnight, the transitional government of Syria, led by Commander of HTS, Ahmed Al-Sharaa, came out of the ashes of a dictatorship of several decades. In a few days, Turkey reopened its embassy, Saudi Arabia offered a diplomatic relationship and the United States raised the $ 10 million bonus in Al-Sharaa after a meeting. In December 2024, Qatar and France recognized this authority, while Russia, Great Britain and Iraq showed the opening. However, this rapid acceptance of an unleashed and rooted regime of the terrorist – is the takeover of the Taliban in 2021 – undermines the established standards. He dismisses democracy, excuses the violent past of HTS and erases an order based on rules, because states promote strategy to the law.
The takeover of the Taliban of Afghanistan in 2021 and the rapid rise of HTS in Syria highlight a disturbing trend: military control prevails over legitimacy and democratic responsibility. This scheme, driven by inconsistent global recognition standards, the risks encouraging extremist factions – such as the Islamic State in Iraq, Al -Qaeda in Yemen, and Lebanon in Lebanon Abdullah Azzam, to pursue similar strategies, a consequence of outcome, a conflict of the region following a region. The rise of HTS has shown that states prioritize strategic interests on legal values. Turkey, a long -standing supporter of the Syrian opposition, acted quickly: on December 12, 2024, the intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin visited Damascus, initiating support for stabilization efforts. Two days later, his embassy reopened, affirming previous ties. Saudi Arabia, thwarting Iran, followed: on January 24, 2025, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Faisal Bin Farhan, met Al-Sharaa in Damascus; A week later, on February 2, the visit of Riyadh d’Al -Sharaa – his first as a leader – achieved a diplomatic victory.
The warm welcome of Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman reported the Arab recognition. Qatar recognized the transitional government and sent a delegation to Damascus on December 12. France approved HTS through the talks of the shipment Jean-François Guillaume. The United States has opted for de facto engagement, raising the Al-Sharaa bonus after a December meeting. On February 12, the Vladimir Putin of Russia held a constructive call with Al-Sharaa, going to the establishment of HTS as a terrorist group. Iraq invited Al-Sharaa to an Arab summit in May 2025, and Abdel Fattah El-Sissi in Egypt welcomed him to a summit of March 4, where he met the Palestinian chief Mahmoud Abbas and urged the withdrawal of Israel from southern Syria. The UN Geir Pedersen, meeting Al-Sharaa in December, put pressure for inclusiveness under resolution 2254.
The slower path of the Taliban towards acceptance strongly contrasts. Since the seizure of Afghanistan in 2021, he has ruled without elections or a constitution, lacking in degree recognition by February 2025 despite links with China, Russia and Pakistan. Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey keep pragmatic ties, while Saudi Arabia reopened its Kabul embassy in December 2024. The United States, via the channels of Qatar and the United Nations, prioritize humanitarian needs on legitimacy. Its rule of exclusion – bench of education for women, the touch of minorities – defines standards, which hinders broader acceptance.
HTS gained a faster good will. The promises of inclusiveness of Al-Sharaa, the invitations to ex-ba’athists like Farouk al-Sharaa and the prisoner outings suggest moderation. Unlike the gender apartheid of the Taliban, HTS avoids preventing women from public life, although its position is not tested. The fall of Assad, marked by war crimes, throws HTS as a liberator. However, the world overlooks the dark past of HTS, exchanging Assad’s autocracy for an unproven group.
The vulnerability of the parties of Asia and the Middle East to terrorist groups entering power raises concerns that this could become a reproducible strategy. The constitutive theory, linking legitimacy to recognition, vacillates while HTS wins de facto and formal support. If the brute force is sufficient for recognition, groups like Iskp in Afghanistan or AQAP in Yemen can seek to reproduce this model. Hurras al-Din in Idlib, Jaish al-Adl on the Iranian border, or Pakistan of Tehrik-E-Taliban could exploit the vacuums. Syria risks losing oil fields to the Islamic State; Iraq’s fault lines invite resurgence; Yemen AIDS AQAP; Lebanon tries the jihadists; And Iran faces threats to the borders.
In Yemen, where the Houthis fight in a southern southern it, Aqap could grasp the success of HTS, potentially making Aden a jihadist center. Lebanon, in shock from the collapse of Hezbollah in 2023-24 with Israel and economic collapse, invites the Sunni extremists to exploit the rifts – Arsal, a militant border city, could be the next one. The rural areas of Iraq, tracked down by Islamic State cells, the resurgence of risks if Baghdad is weakening. These nations, marked by proxy wars and failed governance, face greater threats because the HTS model suggests that the territorial conquest can gain tolerance, if not legitimacy.
Recognition of the government led by HTS in Syria could galvanize terrorist groups inside, provoke crises as they imitate the territorial acquisition for acceptance. The troubles in Jaramana, a suburb of Damascus, show this: Syria sent forces after a militia linked to the Assad regime killed an officer at a control point, defying surrender. Lieutenant -Colonel Hussam al -Tahan told Sana that he targets illegal groups, but the shock – the friendship of the Defense Defense request of the Druze of Israel – reveals how the militias, embraced by HTS, could exploit a weak authority. Hurras al-Din and the Islamic State could seize the territory, aggravating post-Assad chaos.
This danger broke out in the Allawite coastal bastions of Syria, where the security forces clashed with armed pro-assad men in latakie and tangy in early March 2025, killing more than 130 people, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Acceptance by HTS by Turkey and Saudi Arabia has fueled such disorders, inviting rival factions to grasp the territory and request similar recognition. Israel, claiming to protect minorities, and Iran, potentially supporting the Alawites, exploits this chaos – pushing Syria towards the partition and the creation of a fractured state where power replaces the law. For world powers, HTS recognition poses a strategic dilemma. Iran has lost Assad – a major blow in the region. The United States and the Allies, vocals on democracy, weigh their anti-Iranian position against a non-elected jihadist regime. This gain could vacillate if HTS becomes radical or if Russia and China exploit the game book, making the Middle East a proxy failure.
The strategy – “Take the territory, wait for acceptance” – worked for the 20 -year Taliban’s efforts and the rapid strike of HTS. Without strict conditions, states may legitimize power without elections. The assertion of Al-Sharaa on December 30 according to which the elections could take four years did not meet any discharge from the United States or Europe-a silence signaling the stability of democracy, but at what price? This precedent erodes the fundamental values of international relations, in particular democracy, responsibility and human rights. The unclean rule of HTS, like the Taliban, runs along these standards. De facto commitment – embassies, trade, talks – increase resources without membership of the treaty. Their past atrocities – HTS civil attacks, the Taliban links in al -Qaeda – have not been treated, their intentions not tested by enforceable promises. Trade with third parties, such as Chinese mineral transactions in Afghanistan or Turkey in Syria, risks fueling corruption – Opium trade in Afghanistan now represents 90% of the global heroine supply, prospering in a governance vacuum.
The rush towards the recognition of HTS reflects a realistic rush: Turkey secures its border, Saudi Arabia against Iran, the United States and Israel weaken Tehran’s attorney – without troops. This low -cost and high impact model could try wider use. States could support the Islamic State in Iraq or AQAP in Yemen to reshape the region. The success of the HTS of Turkey depends on moderation; Elsewhere, it risks chaos. The absence of a global standard – each acting independently – underlines the predictability of international law. UN directives linking elections could align legitimacy without rigidity. For the moment, HTS fills the void of Assad, but at a cost: a Middle East where terrorists become politicians, eroding democracy in a fragile region. Stability is likely a forest fire today tomorrow – unless this game is redesigned.
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