The name of Starlink draws from the novel The fault in our stars By John Green about two adolescents with cancer who find love and a significant link while facing their forces out of their control. Like these characters who refuse their determined fate, the Pacific nations are faced with a fight against external powers. While Starlink satellites multiply in orbit, the nations of the Pacific Island find themselves at the center of a new “big game” between competing powers offering technological “gifts” with attached channels or a risk to be left in the digital age. Through the Pacific Ocean, from Niue to Palaos, a new form of colonialism, supposedly technocolonialism, emerges with infrastructure as its main vehicle. The submarine cables carrying 99% of global data traffic and satellite networks like Starlink have become the shipping routes and trading stations of our digital time. Technology giants and their billionaire owners, not nation states, are more and more working as the colonial power of 21st century.
Starlink offers connectivity solutions to which Pacific governments have trouble resisting, especially for communities dispersed on the remote islands. Nevertheless, under this surface usefulness is a deeper concern: dependence on technology controlled by foreign technology oligarchs which do not respond to any electorate and recognize any border. This digital dependence came with hidden costs, for sure. The president of Palau, Surangel Whipps Jr., clearly declared this situation: “We have a huge debt that we must reimburse, so allow Starlink uncontrolled would mean a reduction in income to pay these cables.” Having committed to building self -proclaimed digital infrastructure thanks to loans from development partners, these nations are now watching Starlink threaten to make these investments financially unsustainable.
The armament of essential digital services has become a decisive characteristic of modern power struggles. The devastating of January 2022 Hungna Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai Volcano Eruption and Tsunami revealed this vulnerability. The disaster has separated the only underwater fiber optic cable from the Tonga and made the country digitally isolated from the world. While Starlink immediately provided emergency connectivity, and Australia and the latter in New Zealand intervened to support long-term catering efforts, this disaster exposed the precarious position of nations depending on connectivity solutions with single source. Likewise, Vanuatu lost communication connectivity in December 2024 due to a strong earthquake.
Such a model extends beyond the Pacific. Meta’s free basic program in Africa offered “free internet” which was actually an enclosed garden of meta-approved content. It is criticized as redefining what “Internet” meant for millions of African users. When countries like Egypt in 2015 and India in 2016 recognized this digital enclosure and prohibited service, they were confronted with reactions and development accusations, which is the modern equivalent of resisting “civilizing colonial influence. Even more worrying is the way in which the United Arab Emirates are used to Totok Messaging Application which presented itself as a secure communication tool, to carry out mass monitoring of its users. Digital infrastructure does not only concern connectivity but serves more and more as a vector for political control and the collection of information on populations.
Even Europe, despite its economic power and its regulatory managers such as the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) has not escaped this so-called digital colonization. The most used communication services on the continent, such as WhatsApp, Facebook and Instagram provided by Meta, Gmail, YouTube and Drive supplied by Google and other platforms, are controlled by American technology giants. Europeans carry out their most sensitive personal and professional communications through infrastructure that they do not have or control. Despite aggressive regulatory efforts, Europe remains a digital vassal state, data from its citizens circulating through channels belonging to the United States, creating vulnerabilities that the Pacific nations would be wise to recognize when they make their own connectivity decisions.
While Starlink develops through the Pacific, he moves control of essential communications to private technological companies based far from their coasts. This gradual concentration of digital influence follows familiar historical models where commercial entities initially offered precious services before accumulating wider forms of influence. Although the promise requires connectivity, these satellite constellations represent a subtle transformation of sovereignty, because the digital paths of island nations are increasingly dependent on the decisions taken in foreign conference rooms rather than by local governments. The invisible nature of this influence, circulating through signals rather than by physical occupation, makes it both more acceptable and potentially more omnipresent than the previous forms of external control.
For the nations of the Pacific Island, the choice between the starlink infrastructure, provided by Chinese (mainly by Huawei), or alternatives on a quad, represents a modern geopolitical dilemma. The Minister of Communications of Tuvalu, Simon Kofe, maintains a pragmatic position concerning Starlink: “We do not care about beliefs (of musks) and its policy. It is purely its solution. However, Tuvalu has simultaneously accepted support for Japan in cybersecurity while signing the Union Falespili Treaty with Australia, which includes provisions concerning security agreements alongside climate change assistance. This balance between competing powers echoes the colonial era tactics to play imperial rivals against each other to maintain a certain degree of independence. The difference today is the invisible nature of the control of digital infrastructure, which often escapes from the maintenance applied to military bases or resource extractions.
The challenges have become clear when X suspended the accounts of journalists criticizing the owner of the platform, Elon Musk (who also owns Starlink), proving how fast the digital services can become tools of personal or political agendas. With the central role of Musk in the Trump administration, the Pacific nations depositing on Starlink could find themselves vulnerable to American political pressures transmitted by ostensibly private channels.
Some Pacific nations are pioneering approaches to maintain digital sovereignty in the middle of this new wave of technocolonialism. The solution can reside in regulatory executives who integrate new technologies without abandoning control, requiring local data storage, ensuring fair contribution to infrastructure costs and maintaining several connectivity options. Fiji have implemented solid national data protection frameworks requiring local data storage, while Vanuatu is carefully balanced several suppliers, including traditional telecommunications networks alongside satellite services. These strategies minimize the dependence of any single technological enterprise or foreign entity. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA) (DSA) (DSA) represent similar attempts to recover digital sovereignty dominated by American technological companies, offering potential models for the Pacific nations. Even Europe has recognized that the authorization to allow giants of non -European technology without control leads to a form of digital vassalage.
While the Quad Alliance mobilizes resources to counter the digital Chinese influence, such as open radio access networks, and private companies like Starlink offer their own solutions, Pacific countries have the opportunity to take advantage of this competition rather than become its victims. By maintaining several connectivity options, requiring local data storage, investing in cybersecurity training and carefully assessing the geopolitical implications of digital infrastructure decisions, these nations can write their own infinity which may be small in geopolitics, but always a universe for their own manufacture. Pacific nations may not control the technological forces that reshape our world, but they can choose how and on what terms they engage with them.
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