The devastating civil war that has swallowed Syria since 2011 has fundamentally reshaped the country’s political landscape. Although the military confrontations have largely diminished, fronts have gone from the battlefields to the rear-salt negotiations. This transition period presents both opportunities and risks for all the actors involved. For the Autonomous Administration of Northern Syria and East (Aanes), the basic demand remains unchanged: a federal Syria which recognizes its model of pluralist and decentralized governance.
Syria has a largely forgotten federal past. Under the French mandate, the country was divided into a series of autonomous entities called the rising states. These structures reflected the ethnic, geographic and sectarian diversity of the region. This model contrasts directly with the centralized B’Athist system which later came to define Syria after independence. The center of Ba’athiste, supervised as an Arab ultra-nationalism, sought to impose a singular identity on a fundamentally plural society. He managed to remove the difference, but not to eliminate it. The Arab Spring has revealed the fragility of this arrangement. The Ba’ath system has collapsed and Bashar al-Assad is now an asylum seeker in Moscow.
But the question is not simply what will replace the old system. The real question is whether realities in the field will be taken into account in the construction of a new Levant or if the country will repeat history by reproducing a bad imitation of the B’Athist tragedy. All signs suggest the latter, although federalism is a must for the future of Syria. In this context, the Autonomous Administration of Northern and East Syria (Aanes) must urgently develop a clear and strategic outing plan before it is structurally sidelined.
Following the conflict of October 7, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), despite his jihadist heritage, quickly progressed through Syria with little resistance. The group took advantage of the collapse of the Iranian regional axis and increasing fatigue with the reign of Assad. He captured Damascus in a few days. However, his momentum proved to be short -lived. Israeli air strikes have destroyed what remained of Syrian military infrastructure. The sanctions continued to stifle the economy. On the other hand, the Autonomous Administration of Northern Syria and the East (Aanes) has persisted as a functional and autonomous entity. He administers regions that produce more than half of Syria’s internal income. Régied by Kurdish leadership and based on gender equality and decentralization, Aanes presents a direct ideological challenge to HTS. At the same time, the Allawites communities on the coast and the populations of Southern Druze began to express requests for autonomy.
HTS wrote an authoritarian constitution and declared a closed and exclusive government. His abuses and crimes against civilians and the refusal to engage in pluralist politics have sparked a wave of resistance, including the massacre against the alawite civilians of the Syrian coast. The Israeli pro-Druze intervention and pro-Kurdish rhetoric increased pressure on Damascus. The newly formed Shara government quickly understood that without a transfer to realistic foreign policy, its position would weaken. Western actors have clearly indicated that the sanctions would remain unless HTS modify the course. Even with the support of more independent actors such as Russia, the Gulf or Turkey, Ahmed Al-Shara could not take to Syria.
Aanes controls the major part of the oil and agricultural production of Syria, as well as critical water infrastructures. Damascus does not have an alternative source of income to replace these regions. Despite this, Aanes remains diplomatically sidelined. HTS, despite his file, continues to receive more diplomatic engagement thanks to the direct support of several stakeholders in the State. The main reason for the isolation of Aanes is the continuous objection of Turkey. Ankara depicts Aanes as an extension of the PKK and actively works to block its recognition.
Turkey now seems to accept that military operations are not a long -term viable solution. It has evolved to prevent the Aanese from being part of the post-war state structure. Instead of a direct confrontation, Turkey encourages the Syrian government to act as a pragmatic international player while avoiding the formation of an inclusive national framework. This approach pushes Damascus to present a rational frontage abroad while excluding Kurds and other autonomous internal actors.
The signs of this strategy are already visible. The Shara government, formerly defined by its jihadist position, seems to recalibrate. Syria recently arrested two members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad who would be involved in the October 2023 attacks. Diplomacy mediated by Azerbaijan explores normalization with Israel and Turkey. The State of Azerbaijan’s State of Azerbaijan has proposed to modernize the Syrian oil fields. Syrian economists have entered the international monetary fund. At the same time, Turkey has announced a diplomatic “war” targeting YPG and Syria should appoint a new foreign minister with references from the Ba’ath era. The ties of warming with the Gulf countries suggest that the Shara government wants to seem pragmatic on the international scene. However, this repositioning was not accompanied by an internal reform. For Aane, this has a dangerous paradox. The regime can gain legitimacy abroad while refusing to adopt an inclusive policy at home.
Aanes faces a strategic dilemma. It is economically essential and institutionally stable, but diplomatically vulnerable. The international system continues to be shaped by interests rather than by legitimacy or contribution. Without a clear outing strategy that favors regional partnerships, international visibility and institutional depth, Aanes may be excluded from the future Syrian order. He can continue to bear the economic and administrative burden of the state when he is marginalized and gradually loses his autonomy. The signature by the commander of the homeless Mazloum Abdi of a framework agreement with Ahmed Al-Shara marks a step towards the recognition of Aane, but the balance of powers in this relationship will be ultimately shaped by a diplomatic lever effect. What has been acquired by sacrifice can still be lost without a clear and proactive strategy.
The recent remarks of Elham Ahmed highlight this challenge from a realistic point of view. “We see that strictly centralized systems do not solve the problems but deepen them,” she said. “Syria must not come back to the way it was before 2011. It must be decentralized and give the rights of all the Syrian components.” It added “our current plan is to preserve what exists and we will try to be more involved in Syria and participate in each process.” These comments reflect the basic dilemma against Aane. Time turns while the Shara government is lobbying to acquire legitimacy in international circles and the Aanes should present themselves as an international player before it is too late.
As an example, in the early 1990s, when Yugoslavia disintegrated in violence, Slovenia has taken a different path. It was the smallest of the republics, but also the most economically integrated into Western Europe. Unlike Bosnia or Kosovo, Slovenia did not wait for permission from the Federal Center. He admitted that the system collapsed and actually acted. By strengthening institutional capacities, aligning in European markets and projecting a pragmatic foreign policy, he succeeded in leaving the Federation with a minimal conflict and obtaining early international recognition. This did not make him stronger militarily, but it gave Slovenia what the others in the region lacked: a strategic outing of chaos.
The Aanes are now faced with a similar decision. It is structurally central to the Syrian economy but politically excluded. It has functional governance institutions, a pluralist administrative model and a degree of legitimacy in the regions it controls. But if he does not define his own future, others will do so. The Syrian regime, with Turkish support, actively shapes an post-war order which isolates the Aaners while benefiting from the stability it generates. If Aanes remains reactive, this may become an administrative tool without a political agency.
An exit strategy for Aane does not mean secession. This means investing in long -term survival thanks to serious capacity strengthening and proactive diplomacy. The Aanese must deepen the links with the regional government of Kurdistan in Iraq, establish a modest but functional cooperation with Israel, Jordan and the Gulf, show its will to participate in regional integration projects such as Abraham Agreements and IMEC, create formal mechanisms of international awareness. Beyond military deterrence, its greatest asset should be institutional legitimacy. He must present himself as a constructive player capable of regional integration, coordination and wealth.
Capacity building must go beyond local councils. It must include economic transparency, budgetary systems, education and diplomatic literacy. The Aanes should begin to present themselves not only as a temporary authority born from the conflict, but as an administrative long -term alternative based on the regional stability of the Levant. This requires active commitment to the media, reflection groups, research institutions and diaspora networks. Aans must become visible, not only functional. The window is narrow. Unlike Slovenia, Aanes does not have access to European institutions or immediate diplomatic recognition. But it has a lever effect, popular legitimacy and administrative consistency. He cannot afford to wait until the world notices it. He must shape his own future when there is still space to do so.
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