It has been a year since the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. Israel was caught off guard, despite warnings from the Military Intelligence Directorate. Two letters warned the Israeli government, followed by the Shin Bet which relayed the same information, hinting at a possible imminent war planned by Iran’s proxies. They believed that Benjamin Netanyahu’s controversial judicial reforms constituted a weak point generating the potential for chaos within the Knesset and Israeli society and that an attack must therefore be timely. Since then, Israel’s war has not been limited to Hamas and Hezbollah; but also to a wide range of militias across the Gulf in the form of the Axis of Resistance.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, composed of Popular Mobilization Units (UMP) also called al-Hashd al-Sha’bi issued statements condemning Zionist arrogance in Gaza and Lebanon. These groups are mainly composed of Shiites and include the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah and Saraya Talia al-Khorasan. In terms of intensity of engagement, Israel is engaged in a two-front war with Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, it is simultaneously involved on seven fronts across the Middle East, with most of the fighting concentrated in Lebanon. Since September 30, the Israeli army has struck around 1,100 targets in southern Lebanon, ensuring the destruction of Hezbollah’s intelligence headquarters and weapons production sites.
Gradually, the ring of fire created by Iran and its militias was extinguished through a combination of cyberattacks and Israeli air campaigns. Furthermore, a direct confrontation between Israel and Iran is gaining momentum. Anticipation that Hezbollah would resist the Israeli advance in Lebanon did not materialize as many envisioned due to the assassination of its leader Hassan Nasrallah and high-ranking military commanders, including the Guards Corps. of the Islamic Revolution (IRGC). The IDF has opened a new front in Lebanon on the west coast, along the Mediterranean coast, while concomitant airstrikes are constant on the Bekaa Valley and southern Beirut. A number of Syrian and Palestinian refugees live in this camp.
Hezbollah’s retaliatory strategy is currently quite distanced, deliberately avoiding close contact with Israeli soldiers and organizing remote attacks. For example, the commander of the IDF 36th Division observed that most Hezbollah fighters were either retreating deeper into Lebanon or fleeing the battlefield, fearing capture or death. However, some fighters are using mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to counterattack, while others are taking shelter in residential buildings. Additionally, the IDF has acknowledged that unlike Hamas, Hezbollah is organized and operates on the surface using long-range weapons systems and asymmetric attacks.
The IDF’s 188th Armored Brigade wiped out Hezbollah’s highly acclaimed special forces – the “Radwan Force” in border villages and decimated their headquarters in Yaroun and Maroun al Ras. The 35th and 85th Brigades clashed with Hezbollah militias and discovered a seven-meter underground tunnel housing munitions. The 36th Division fought the militants in southern Lebanon and managed to repel at least five hundred militants. In retaliation for the IDF’s ground operations, Hezbollah has intensified its missile attacks targeting new sites in northern Israel. Additionally, sources affiliated with Hezbollah claim that IDF withdrew of Odaisseh and Kfar Kila. On October 8, it fired 40 rockets at the port city of Haifa, causing panic and fear among Israelis. Although most were intercepted, some injuries were reported by shrapnel. Another barrage of 110 medium-range missiles was launched on Haifa and another twenty on Kiryat Shmona, where two civilians were killed. This is part of Hezbollah’s plan to demonstrate that its capabilities have not been weakened – hence the demonstration of aerial aggression and the focus on new targets deep within Israel. The IDF 91st Division has since reported capturing an undisclosed location in southern Lebanon that was used to fire rockets, further preventing missile launches into northern Israel. Yet this does not mean that Tel Aviv has achieved the stated goal of returning its population to northern Israel.
Even as Israeli military operations outside its territory bear fruit, the internal security situation has worsened with a torrent of attacks by the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). ). On October 8, a fighter from the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades stabbed several Israeli citizens, seriously injuring them – he was later killed by security forces. Apparently he was from Umm al Fahm, a town in northern Israel. Another incident involved four Al Aqsa group fighters who were captured and the Yamam anti-terrorism unit cordoned off the vehicle and shot at them in a pre-emptive move to bring the threat under control. Finally, PIJ and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades attacked Israeli forces in three separate locations with small arms and IEDs. These attacks are part of the Axis of Resistance’s broader goal of keeping the West Bank in turmoil so that a new front preoccupies Israeli security forces. It is also worth noting that Hezbollah is once again capable of firing rockets deep into Israeli territory, indicating that it has regained tactical control of its missile arsenals alongside the recovery of its command centers. Although Hezbollah has regained control of its dilapidated command structure, its forces have been decommissioned in addition to the depletion of their weapons arsenals. Although reports on this are unclear.
Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem has officially called for a ceasefire, although he remains largely defiant, threatening that if Israeli attacks do not stop, the militia will not stop. Even if Hezbollah may appear recalcitrant, the words of Ibrahim Moussawi, member of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc, do not inspire confidence in the current trajectory of the war against Israel. With Hezbollah’s leadership in disarray, its fighters avoiding direct confrontation with the IDF, and its combat capabilities limited, Israel would likely up the ante against Iran.
The United States, Iran and Arab states are in secret talks to end all wars in West Asia and it appears that Israel has been kept informed of this initiative. In a categorical move, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian held talks with the government of Qatar where he met with the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia and later, the foreign minister of Tehran visited Riyadh to discuss the increasing casualties in Gaza and Lebanon and to seek ways to avoid further escalation. Iran has threatened to break the truce between Saudi Arabia and Iran if Gulf states help Israel use their airspace – including attacking all US military bases in the region, regardless of their location. Thus, Iran sought neutrality from the Gulf States, that is to say the absence of granting airspace to carry out operations or use of military bases. Apparently this assurance was granted.
What could be Israel’s plan of action towards Iran? The distance between Israel and Iran is quite long and an Israeli ground invasion is therefore almost certainly ruled out. First and foremost, Israel would necessarily need aerial refueling and could opt to suppress enemy air defenses or (SEAD) with F-35 stealth fighter jets in order to block Israel’s Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). Tehran. so that aerial maneuvers can be carried out quickly for precision strikes, stealth raids and mobility in the air battlespace.
Second, they could strike Isfahan because it is home to a military airbase, F-14 Tomcat fighter jets, a weapons factory, air defense systems, bunkers and a nearby nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz. On April 19, Israel invaded Iranian airspace using quadcopter drones and missiles to confuse Iranian air defenses and successfully destroying its S-300 anti-aircraft battery. This time, they might want to further damage its air defense systems and munitions warehouses.
Third, fears of Israel striking Iran’s nuclear sites are widespread, although such a dangerous move seems implausible as it could perhaps attract other powers, provoking a wider conflict. This is why the United States refused to approve it. Washington’s reluctance to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities stems from oversight by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which concluded that Iran’s supreme leader had not reversed his 2003 decision to create a bomb. However, the hard-line lobby in Iran wants to speed up this process. It would appear that the destruction of Iranian nuclear sites is not an easy retaliatory measure. For example, the Natanz nuclear facility is buried deep underground while Fordow is nestled under rocks deemed out of range of Israeli bunker busting bombs. According to military experts (although this seems out of the question) a Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) or (GBU-57A/B), a colossal 30,000 pound bomb encased in steel and assembled jointly with the United States United, could possibly destroy this nuclear site. .
Complete disintegration of Iran’s nuclear facilities is unlikely, but a drastic reduction in Iran’s nuclear capacity is possible. As Israel has stated that a larger-scale attack on Iran would be a fatal surprise, we will have to wait until that happens to offer further analysis.
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