The quadrilateral security dialogue, known as the Quad, has undergone a significant transformation in recent years, becoming a central pillar of India’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region. Originally created to coordinate relief following the 2004 tsunami, the Quad, comprising the United States, Japan, Australia and India, has evolved into a strategic partnership focused on ensuring security and stability regional, particularly in response to China’s growing influence. As the Quad continues to expand its reach, recent developments at the 2024 Quad Summit and India’s well-negotiated disengagement with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) illustrate how New Delhi must skillfully balance its national interests.
In its early years, the Quad functioned as a diplomatic forum with limited practical implementation. However, since its rebirth in 2017, driven by shared concerns about China’s assertiveness, the Quad has moved toward more concrete initiatives that directly address regional challenges. At Quad Summit 2024, new initiatives were announced that demonstrate the group’s commitment to reshaping the strategic and economic landscape of the Indo-Pacific. One of the key outcomes was the Quad Ports of the Future partnership, aimed at developing sustainable and resilient port infrastructure in the region. The initiative serves as a counterpoint to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has been instrumental in expanding Beijing’s influence through financing infrastructure projects in Asia, Africa and China. Latin America. India’s role in this project is crucial, as it will host the first regional conference on ports and transport in Mumbai in 2025. This positioning reflects India’s growing importance in regional connectivity and maritime security, in line with its objective “Security and growth for all in the region”. (SAGAR).
The group has embarked on the most significant maritime initiative to date, the Quad-at-Sea Ship Observation Mission in 2025. This mission will involve a collaborative exercise conducted by the respective Coast Guards of India , Japan and the United States, as well as by the Australian Border Force, aboard a US Coast Guard vessel in the Indo-Pacific region. The main objective of this exercise is “to improve interoperability and advance maritime security”. Official Quad documents maintain a cautious stance regarding this mission. As the Quad countries participate in maritime exercises under Malabar with other partners, this combined Coast Guard operation represents an unprecedented undertaking involving only the four partners. The hesitation of countries like India to establish such a mechanism seems to have gradually diminished.
In addition to infrastructure, the Quad is making significant progress in digital connectivity and emerging technologies. The group announced initiatives to deploy 5G through Open RAN systems, designed to reduce dependence on Chinese telecommunications technology. Indian institutions are at the forefront of this effort, helping to establish secure networks in the Indo-Pacific region. Additionally, the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience focuses on strengthening submarine cable networks, critical to securing digital communications in the region, with India playing a key role in the expansion cable maintenance capabilities.
These developments demonstrate how the Quad has evolved beyond a loose coalition of like-minded democracies to become a platform for concrete regional projects. This change is crucial for India, as it allows New Delhi to contribute to regional security without explicitly engaging in direct military confrontations with China. Although the Quad has become a valuable platform for India, its strategic calculus is complicated by its relations with China. India and China have a long history of border disputes, which culminated in a deadly confrontation in the Galwan Valley in 2020. However, recent disengagement efforts along the LAC indicate potential de-escalation, even as the relationship remains full of tension. This disengagement is important because it influences India’s engagement in the Quad and its positioning vis-à-vis China.
For India, it is essential to maintain a peaceful border with China, as open conflict could strain its military resources and weaken its position in the Quad. This is particularly relevant given that India is the only Quad member with a direct land border with China, making it particularly vulnerable to military escalations. The recent disengagement allows India to focus on strengthening its maritime security in the Indo-Pacific across the Quad and smaller islands, rather than getting drawn into a prolonged military standoff on its northern border. However, this disengagement does not mean that India can afford to relax its vigilance. Ongoing Chinese investments in India’s neighboring countries, such as Pakistan and Sri Lanka, through the BRI, continue to strategically encircle India. Thus, India’s participation in the Quad remains crucial to counterbalance China’s influence in the region. By focusing on non-traditional security issues, such as infrastructure, digital connectivity and capacity building, India can engage in the Quad in a way that does not provoke open military conflict with China , but which nevertheless preserves its strategic interests.
One of the challenges India faces in the Quad is the different strategic priorities of its partners. While the United States, Japan and Australia are primarily focused on the Western Pacific and countering Chinese influence in areas such as the South China Sea, India’s primary focus remains Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Quad’s new maritime initiative, including the Quad-at-Sea Ship Observation Mission, aims to strengthen interoperability among member coast guards and improve maritime security. However, India’s emphasis on IOR requires balancing its engagement in the Pacific with its core strategic interests closer to home. Therefore, India primarily seeks to protect the IOR from dragon influence in the Asian backyard while maintaining limited coverage in the Pacific.
Moreover, although economic relations between India and China complicate its positioning, the Quad allows India to seek other avenues of growth and development. By participating in projects that promote supply chain resilience and reduce reliance on Chinese manufacturing, India can strengthen its economy without alienating Beijing. The Quad’s focus on critical and emerging technologies also presents new opportunities for India to strengthen its technology sector, reducing its dependence on Chinese imports in key areas such as telecommunications and technology. AI.
India’s strategic autonomy is a fundamental principle of its foreign policy, and its participation in the Quad must be analyzed in this perspective. India has always been cautious about closely aligning with a single military alliance, and the Quad is no exception. Although the group does not constitute a formal military alliance, increased military cooperation within the Quad – such as the Malabar naval exercises – represents an emerging trend. Experts say India needs to recalculate its military actions as positioning the Quad too close to Indo-Pacific strategies could inadvertently cause an escalation of tensions between China in the Eastern Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This could lead to a strategic shift, potentially opening a new front of maritime rivalry that India would prefer to avoid.
India has strengthened its defense ties with all Quad members through bilateral agreements, including the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) with the United States, which gives India access to advanced military technologies. India maintains a cautious approach to escalating tensions with China. The recent disengagement from the LAC allows India to focus on developing military interoperability in the maritime domain, rather than getting involved in land and maritime conflicts. This strategic move allows India to contribute to the Quad’s security objectives without over-engaging in direct military confrontations, which could potentially compromise its economic and diplomatic interests in the region.
India’s participation in the Quad presents both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, the Quad provides India with a platform to counterbalance China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region, notably through initiatives in infrastructure, technology and maritime security . On the other hand, India’s unique geographic and strategic position – bordering China – requires careful management of its relations with Beijing to avoid military escalation. The recent disengagement in the LAC region provides India with an opportunity to focus on the broader strategic objectives of the Quad without being distracted by border tensions.
As the Quad continues to evolve, India is likely to play a greater role in shaping its agenda, particularly in areas such as digital connectivity, infrastructure development and maritime cooperation. However, India’s engagement will remain pragmatic, ensuring that it can secure its national interests while preserving its strategic autonomy in an increasingly multipolar world. In this act of hedging, India stands to gain significant benefits from its active participation in the Quad, provided it can continue to manage the complexities of its relationship with China and the different priorities of its Quad partners. The future of India’s role in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on its ability to leverage the Quad’s growing influence while preserving its own strategic and economic imperatives.
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