Since the announcement on October 3 of the conclusion of an agreement between the United Kingdom and Mauritius for the transfer of sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago, there have been numerous political and media comments. Some of them were well informed, others less so. In the latter category, former Prime Minister Boris Johnson called the decision “purely political correctness”, and Reform leader Nigel Farage called the decision a “capitulation” and a “strategic disaster”. It has also been suggested that the handover of the Chagos Archipelago could precipitate a domino effect in which some of the remaining 13 British Overseas Territories (BOTs) could also be ceded by the UK. This article discusses the UK’s decision to cede sovereignty to Mauritius and the likely implications, if any, for other BOTs.
The Chagos Archipelago is located in the middle of the Indian Ocean and consists of seven atolls and 60 islands. It is officially known as the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) and, in various forms, has been under British control since 1814. The origins of the decision to cede sovereignty date back to 1965, when before independence of Mauritius, the Chagos Archipelago was removed from the territory. , creating BIOT. Independence was conditional on the achievement of detachment. Then, from 1968 to 1973, the indigenous Chagossian population was expelled. These decisions were made to ensure that the US-British military base subsequently built at Diego Garcia was as secure as possible.
In recent years, pressure has increased against maintaining British sovereignty over the archipelago, which was beginning to undermine the UK’s legitimacy and authority over the BIOT, with increasing risks of hosting a base military over a contested jurisdiction. Indeed, the British Conservative government, which began negotiations with Mauritius in 2022, recognized this more difficult legal and diplomatic situation. Several decisions have shaken the United Kingdom’s position.
First, there was the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2015 that the marine protected zone established by the United Kingdom around the BIOT was not compatible with the Convention’s obligations to take due account of the rights of Maurice and to consult her. Second, in 2019, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory ruling, arguing that “the decolonization process was not legally completed” and that the UK’s contribution constituted an “unlawful act”. This decision was later approved by the United Nations General Assembly. Thirdly and finally, in 2021, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, in a judgment relating to a case involving Mauritius and the Maldives, stated: “The sovereignty of Mauritius over the Chagos Archipelago can be inferred from the decisions of the ICJ”.
Since the United Kingdom’s decision to cede its sovereignty, discussions have taken place on the basis and weight of the decisions, in particular on the fact that the Chagos Archipelago is far from Mauritius and was only attached to Mauritius in 1903, and that the ICJ’s decision was only advisory and should be ignored. This ignores the fact that the weight of international opinion was shifting away from the UK, that the manner in which the BIOT was created was highly problematic, and that the original reason for creating the uninhabited territory (to ensure additional security at the military base) was compromised.
So there are good reasons why the UK government (under the leadership of the Conservatives and now the Labor Party) felt it was time to reach an agreement with Mauritius. Of course, there were several factors to consider and those critical of the deal said it would strengthen China and that Mauritius could not be trusted to abide by the Treaty. However, there are strong arguments in its favor. The ceding of sovereignty (as previously noted) will place the military base on firmer legal footing, strengthen relations with India (which supported the deal) and other partners in the Indo-Pacific region, and provide a essential boost. the arm of decolonization, international law and the role of diplomacy. Even if one disagrees with some of the details of the deal, there are good reasons why it should have been done.
Of course, the Chagossians are caught in the middle; those who were suppressed and the following generations. Their treatment over the past 50 years has undoubtedly been poor and they have fought to be recognized and have a say in their future. Many Chagossians believe that the agreement reached last week still does not take their interests into account. Yet the deal gives some Chagossians the best opportunity in half a century to return to their home country if they wish, and the government is providing more support for Chagossians in the UK. Ultimately, the agreement to cede control between two sovereign states was the necessary prelude to the Chagossians gaining this right of return. If sovereignty had remained contested, such a move would have been more uncertain.
The third strand of the debate is whether the ceding of sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago is merely the end of the divide and will lead to increased pressure on UK sovereignty over certain other UK overseas territories. sea. This argument may seem obvious, but it oversimplifies the complex and nuanced relationships that BOTs have with the UK and other countries that might be of interest to them. The majority of BOTs, including Bermuda, the Caribbean Five, Pitcairn and St. Helena, are uncontested. It is true that there are problems in bilateral relations between them and the United Kingdom which give rise to disagreements, and the balance of decision-making powers is a constant consideration, but they are far from what is happening with the British territory of the Indian Ocean.
Even for the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar and the sovereignty zones of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus, the Chagos Agreement is unlikely to threaten their current status as British Overseas Territories. For the Falkland Islands, Argentina’s rhetoric is often loud and can make things difficult for the islands, but there is also some pragmatism, as evidenced by a new agreement aimed at improving ties between the two. For Gibraltar, the main concern is not that Spain will demand control, but rather whether the heavily used land border can remain open (Gibraltar was not part of the UK’s withdrawal agreement from EU). Finally, the Sovereign Base Areas, which host a Royal Air Force (RAF) base, are supported by an agreement with Cyprus and an arrangement whereby European law applies to non-military parts of the territory, which includes 11,000 Cypriots .
The British government’s decision to cede control of the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius is significant and not without risks. There is also work to be done to guarantee the interests of the Chagossians, and for some, their return. But most of the comments have been hyperbolic and unhelpful. These issues are complex and require special attention.
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